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NOTES
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR:
TRENDS TOWARD JUDICIAL RESTRAINT
Sandra Day O'Connor began her tenure on the United States Supreme
Court without an extensive record as a jurist.' The substantive impact
O'Connor would make on Supreme Court decisions was uncertain when she
took the bench. Prior to her nomination in 1981 to serve as an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court, however, O'Connor favored limiting the
jurisdiction of federal courts and enhancing the states' role in the federal

system. 2 During her confirmation hearings before the United States Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, O'Connor testified without reservation concerning her judicial philosophy.' In the confirmation hearings, O'Connor
confirmed her support of federal judicial restraint. 4 According to O'Connor,
the Court should not function as a policy making body, but rather should
interpret and apply the law.3 In O'Connor's view, the Court should decide
cases on narrow grounds 6 and avoid unnecessarily deciding questions of

constitutional law. 7 O'Connor's testimony on the proper role of the federal

judiciary, however, was not limited to the role of the Court as a branch of
the federal government, but extended to the relationship of the federal court

system to state courts. In response to questions regarding an article' written
by O'Connor in which she explored the relationship between the state and
federal courts, O'Connor clarified her belief in the capacity of state courts
1. See Nomination of Sandra Day O'Connor: Hearings Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary United States Senate, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 57, 115 (1981) (statement of Sen. Grassley)
(noting O'Connor's lack of written record on major judicial issues), reprinted in R. MERSKY
& J. JACOBSTEIN, THE SuPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE SENATE JUDICIARY

1916-1981, at 107 (Supp. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Hearings];see also Matheson,
Justice SandraD. O'Connor, 1981 ARiz. ST. L.J. 649, 649-50 (O'Connor served brief 21 months
as state appellate judge); Schenker, "'Reading" Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, 31 CAT. U.L.
COMMITTEE,

REV. 487, 491 (1982) (O'Connor had little experience with federal constitutional and statutory
issues as state appellate judge).

2. See generally O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the Federal and State
Courtsfrom the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 801 (1981)
(discussing federal review of state court judgments and federal courts' exercise of jurisdiction).
3. See generally Hearings,supra note 1, at 57-255 (1981) (testimony of Hon. Sandra Day
O'Connor, nominated to be Associate Justice of United States Supreme Court).
4. Id. at 60.

5. Id. at 57, 60.
6. Id. at 108. During the confirmation hearings, in addition to urging judicial restraint

in deciding constitutional cases, O'Connor stressed that in deciding a dispute a court may not
look beyond the record and briefs at hand to consider social concerns of the country. Id. at
111, 131, 132.
7. Id. at 60.
8. See generally O'Connor, supra note 2.
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to adjudicate federal constitutional issues. 9 O'Connor urged that federal
courts should accord finality to state court judgments when the defendant
in the state action has had a full and fair opportunity in state court to
litigate a federal constitutional claim. 10 She encouraged the use of the state
courts as the forum of choice, rather than continuing to provide litigants
with an increasing choice of state or federal forums." Moreover, in O'Connor's view, the states always have had significant rights under the tenth
amendment that, despite a lack of strong precedent, the states could assert
to manage their own affairs within the federal system.' 2 Although O'Connor
spoke openly in the hearings concerning her judicial philosophy, she declined
to address particular substantive questions for fear of prejudicing the disposition of cases that might come before the Court in the future. 3 O'Connor's testimony during her confirmation hearings, however, left no doubt
that O'Connor advocated a limitation of the federal judiciary and an
expansion of the role of the states in the federal system. Otherwise, O'Connor's impact on the direction that the Court would take was an open question
at the time of her confirmation.
In the first three years of her tenure on the Court, Justice O'Connor
has filed over one hundred opinions addressing a wide variety of issues. The
overriding trend emerging from O'Connor's opinions is her exercise of
judicial restraint.' 4 Although O'Connor clearly expressed her views during
the confirmation hearings on limiting the scope of the federal judiciary, her
testimony provided no basis to predict the great extent to which judicial
restraint has played a dispositive role in varying substantive contexts. O'Connor has viewed the role of the federal judiciary as limited by the constitutional
powers and duties given Congress and the executive branch, 5 by self-imposed
restrictions, 6 and by the countervailing force of state sovereignty. 17 More
importantly, however, this clear trend in O'Connor's opinions toward limitation of the scope of federal judicial power reflects O'Connor's sensitivity
to the separation of powers doctrine and her commitment to the principles
of federalism.
9. Hearings, supra note 1, at 90, 136, 158.
10. Id. at 73, 209.
11. Id. at 92.
12. Id. at 85-86, 121-22.

13. Id. at 57-58, 116-18; see id. at 80, 84, 107, 199 (O'Connor declined to discuss her
opinions on exclusionary rule, affirmative action, or abortion).
14. See Riggs, Justice O'Connor:A First Term Appraisal, 1983 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 44-45
(finding trend toward judicial restraint in O'Connor's first term decisions); see also Cromwell,
Federalism and Due Process: Some Ruminations, 42 MONT. L. REV. 183, 183-84 (1981).
Professor Cromwell suggests that judicial restraint implies an understanding that clear constitutional standards limit the federal judiciary. Cromwell, supra, at 184.
15. See infra notes 80-98 and accompanying text (discussing deference to Congress).
16. See infra notes 22-63, 99-109, 191-201 and accompanying text (discussing standing
law and limits on equitable remedies).
17. See infra notes 121-90 and accompanying text (discussing role of state courts and
support for state legislative judgments).
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The separation of powers doctrine is implicit in the constitutional framework that allocates power among the judicial, executive, and legislative
branches of the federal government. 8 By fragmenting governmental power,

the framers of the Constitution intended to prevent a concentration of power
in any one branch.1 9 Additionally, the separation of powers indirectly would

ensure the protection of individual constitutional rights. 20 A potential conflict

arises when the separation of powers doctrine imposes restrictions on the

judiciary that result in limitations on the ability of the judiciary to safeguard
2
individual rights effectively. '
18. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 135-37 (2d ed. 1983)

(separation of powers is political doctrine intended to prevent concentration of power in one
branch) [hereinafter cited as NOWAK]; Lee, Preserving Separation of Powers: A Rejection of
Judicial Legislation Through the Fundamental Rights Doctrine, 25 ARIz. L. REv. 805, 806
(1983) (separation of powers is implicit in Constitution); Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as
an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 881, 881 (1983)
(separation of powers exists only in structure of Constitution); see also A. VANDERBILT, THE
DOCTRINE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ITS PRESENT-DAY SIGNIFICANCE 38-47 (1963)
(tracing history of separation of powers doctrine before incorporation into Constitution).
19. NowAK, supra note 18, at 136.
20. See J. CHOPER, Y. KAmisER & L. TamE, THE SUPRE E COtRT: TRENDS AND DEVEL-

OPMENTs 73 (1979) (separation of powers indirectly secures individual rights); Dorsen, Separation
of Powers and Federalism-Two Doctrines with a Common Goal: Confining Arbitrary Authority, 41 ALB. L. REv. 53, 53-54 (1977) (drafters of Constitution chose to secure individual
liberties through separation of powers and federalism); Lee, supra note 18, at 807 (Constitution
protects individual liberties either by explicit provision or by allocation of power). In The
FederalistPapers, James Madison claimed that the Constitution afforded protection to personal
liberties by preventing the accumulation of power in the same hands through the separation of
powers, even if the branches were not totally separate and distinct. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (J.
Madison). In the view of a modem commentator, the Constitution protects individual rights
through the separation of powers to the extent that the judicial branch remains separate,
independent, and free from legislative or executive control. Conant, Introduction to A.
VANDERBILT, supra note 18, at vi.

21. See A. VANDERBILT, supra note 18, at 98 (independence of Court as separate branch
of government protects individual freedoms); Bodensteiner, The Role of FederalJudges: Their
Duty to Enforce the Constitutional Rights of Individuals When the Other Branches of Government Default, 18 VAL. U.L. REv. 1, 1-19 (1983) (defending judicial activism to protect individual
rights). Justice Vanderbilt and Professor Bodensteiner view protection of individual constitutional rights as a necessary function of the judiciary under separation of powers doctrine. See
A. VANDERBILT, supra note 18, at 98 (strength of judiciary lies in its development as independent
coordinate branch of government); Bodensteiner, supra, at 3 (separation of powers does not
bar judicial activism in protecting individual constitutional rights if executive and legislative
branches fail to enforce rights of politically powerless). Vanderbilt sees the independence of the
federal judiciary as essential for protecting individual rights. A. VANDERBILT, supra note 18, at
98. In Vanderbilt's view, judicial inaction is as threatening to the independence of the judiciary
as legislative or executive interference in the judicial branch. Id.; see id. at 128-40 (discussing
judicial deference to other branches and limited judicial review of constitutional questions as
impairing enforcement of individual constitutional rights). Vanderbilt questions whether judicial
restraint threatens the constitutional balance of power. Id. at 129.
Similarly, Professor Bodensteiner relies on the premise that a democratic system of
government that values individual rights needs a strong and active judiciary. Bodensteiner,
supra, at 3. As the legislative and executive branches become less accessible to persons without
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Justice O'Connor, in writing for the Court in Allen v. Wright,2 2 rested the
Court's decision denying standing and dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint on
separation of powers concerns. 23 O'Connor's conclusion in Allen that the
plaintiffs lacked standing reveals O'Connor's view of the power of the federal
24
judiciary itself and of the judiciary's relationship to the executive branch.
Article III of the Constitution, in O'Connor's view, fundamentally limits the
political influence, in Bodensteiner's view, it becomes increasingly important for the judiciary,
as a separate branch of government, to provide a forum for politically powerless individuals.
Id. at 3, 6-7. Bodensteiner concedes his assumption that all three branches should be responsive
to the governed. Id. at 6. Bodensteiner views self-imposed restrictions on judicial review such
as abstention, standing, and deferential review of state legislation as limiting the power of the
judicial branch to protect constitutional rights. Id. at 5. Bodensteiner suggests that the
unwillingness of the courts to hear the claims of the politically powerless raises equal protection
and due process concerns because of the continuing access of the politically influential segment
of the population to the legislative and executive branches. Id. at 19.
In Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, Justice O'Connor rejected,
in part, Bodensteiner's assumption that all three branches of government must be open to the
governed. See Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 104 S. Ct. 1058, 1065
(1984) (O'Connor, J.) (public employees not represented on policy committee have no constitutional right to require government to listen to their views). In Knight, O'Connor found that
individuals have no constitutional right of access to legislative or executive bodies when those
public bodies decide only matters of general policy. Id.; see infra notes 64-77 and accompanying
text (discussion of Knight).
22. 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984) (O'Connor, J.).
23. See infra notes 33-63 and accompanying text (discussion of Allen v. Wright); see also
Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 104 S. Ct. 1058, 1066 (1984) (O'Connor,
J.) (judicial enforcement of constitutional right to be heard in legislative and executive policy
making sessions implicates separation of powers considerations); INS v. Phinpathya, 104 S. Ct.
584, 592-93 (1984) (O'Connor, J.) (separation of powers requires Congress, not judiciary, to
revise statutory provisions governing deportation of aliens). In INS v. Phinpathya, O'Connor,
writing for the majority, declined to increase through judicial decision the discretion of the
Attorney General to suspend the deportation of deportable aliens who failed to meet the
continuous presence requirement under § 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Phinpathya, 104 S. Ct. at 592-93; see Immigration and Nationality Act § 244(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. §
1254(a)(1) (1982) (providing that Attorney General may suspend deportation of otherwise
deportable alien who has been physically present in United States for not less than seven years
preceding alien's application). In Phinpathya, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
determined that Phinpathya had failed to meet the continuous presence requirement of § 244(a)
and denied her application to suspend deportation. 104 S. Ct. at 587-88. The Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the INS decision, but the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the BIA had overemphasized the statutory continuous
presence requirement. See id. at 588. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the
meaning of the continuous presence requirement in § 244(a)(1). Id. Justice O'Connor, writing
for the Court, held that § 244(a) established threshold requirements that a deportable alien
must meet before the Attorney General may exercise his discretion to suspend deportation. Id.
at 589. O'Connor rejected the Ninth Circuit's more generous reading of § 244(a) that relaxed
the continuous presence requirement. Id. at 590-91. In O'Connor's view, the constitutional
allocation of power among the three branches of government requires that only Congress, and
not the courts, may revise existing law. Id. at 592-93.
24. See L. TamE, AmBmsc~A CoNsTrrunoNAL LAW § 3-7, at 52-53 (1978) (justiciability
requires Court to assess its role within federal government).
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power of the federal courts. 25 Within the constitutional framework of separation of powers, article III provides that the power of the federal courts extends to cases or controversies. 26 The development of standing doctrine in
response to the article III case or controversy limitation on the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction 27 is relatively new. 28 The Supreme Court has construed

the article III case or controversy language to require a plaintiff to demonstrate that the plaintiff sustained direct and specific injury, that the defendant
29
caused the injury, and that judicial relief will remedy the plaintiff's injury.

25. Allen, 104 S. Ct. at 3324.
26. U.S. CONST. art. III,

§

2.

27. See L. TRmE, supranote 24, § 3-7, at 52-53 (article III grants subject matter jurisdiction
over cases and controversies).
28. See generally Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional
Requirement?, 78 YLE L.J. 816 (1969) (injury-in-fact requirement did not exist when authors
of Constitution drafted article III). The requirement that a plaintiff must allege injury to achieve
standing before a federal court was unknown when the authors of the Constitution drafted
article III. Id. at 827, 829-30. Eighteenth century English courts permitted a "stranger," an
uninjured plaintiff, to contest any unauthorized governmental action through a writ of prohibition. Id. at 819-27. The only discernible debate among American colonial lawyers was whether
the granting of a writ of prohibition was of right or discretionary. Id. at 838-39. Standing
doctrine was not a factor in American jurisprudence until the Supreme Court's 1923 decision
in Frothingham v. Mellon. Id. at 818-19; see Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488-89
(1923) (requiring that plaintiff must have suffered direct injury to litigate dispute in federal
court). One commentator has observed that the Court did not link standing to article III until
1968 in Flast v. Cohen. Comment, Standing, Separation of Powers, and the Demise of the
Public Citizen, 24 AM. U.L. REV. 835, 840-41, 841 n.20 (1975); see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83, 101 (1968) (holding that article III requires plaintiff to have personal stake in outcome and
parties to have adverse legal interests).
29. See, e.g., Heckler v. Mathews, 104 S. Ct. 1387, 1394 (1984) (article III standing
doctrine requires that plaintiff must show he suffered threatened or actual injury that defendant
caused and that relief requested will remedy); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 10105 (1983) (article III standing doctrine requires that plaintiff show he suffered threatened or
actual injury caused by challenged governmental conduct and that plaintiff establish basis for
equitable relief); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (article III standing doctrine requires as minimum
that plaintiff must show he suffered threatened or actual injury that defendant caused and that
requested relief will remedy). Commentators have criticized the restrictive effect of the particularized injury and causation requirements for article III standing. Critics regard the particularized injury requirement as an effective bar to citizen protests of unconstitutional governmental
conduct because such citizen complaints generally reflect a shared grievance rather than an
individual specific injury. See Logan, Standing to Sue: A Proposed Separation of Powers
Analysis, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 37, 49 (injury-in-fact requirement bars generalized constitutional
claims). See generally Nichol, Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 68 (1984) (criticizing
standing law's reliance on particularized harm requirement); Comment, supra note 28 (tracing
development of citizen standing in federal court). But see Scalia, supra note 18, at 894-95
(approving requirement that plaintiff must suffer concrete and specific injury to contest
governmental action). Observers have noted that the Supreme Court varies its application of
the injury-in-fact requirement depending on the source of the right asserted. The commentators
claim that the Court will defer to a legislative grant of standing, but will be more reluctant to
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Notwithstanding the Court's earlier rejection in Flast v. Cohen30 of the sepa-

ration of powers principle as a basis of the developing article III standing requirements, 3' commentators agree that the Court's application of standing law
under article III increasingly reflects separation of powers concerns. 2 In Allen,
Justice O'Connor, writing for a five-member majority,
squarely rested stand33
ing law on separation of powers considerations.

In Allen, the Supreme Court considered whether a class of black parents
whose children attended nominally desegregated public schools had standing

to challenge the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) failure to deny tax exempt
grant standing when the plaintiff's claim rests on a constitutional right. See L. TamE, supra
note 24, § 3-18, at 80 (article III injury-in-fact requirement limits courts' ability, but not
Congress' ability, to grant standing); Logan, supra, at 59 (Court demonstrates deference to
legislative definitions of injury); Nichol, Standing on the Constitution: The Supreme Court and
Valley Forge, 61 N.C. L. Ray. 798, 816-17 (1983) (statute can provide basis to assert generalized
grievance) [hereinafter cited as Nichol, Standing on the Constitution];see also Logan, supra,
at 48-49, 48 n.54 (present Court has granted standing in higher percentage of cases when
plaintiff raises statutory rather than constitutional claim).
O'Connor, however, writing for an unanimous Court in BreadPoliticalAction Comm.
v. Federal Election Comm'n, construed a statutory grant of standing narrowly by refusing to
expand the class of designated plaintiffs. Bread Political Action Comm. v. Federal Election
Comm'n; 455 U.S. 577, 584 (1982) (O'Connor, J.). In Bread, the Federal Election Campaign
Act (FECA) granted the Federal Election Commission, the national committee of any political
party, and any individual eligible to vote in a national election standing to challenge the
constitutionality of FECA through expedited procedures. Id. at 578. The petitioners in Bread,
two trade associations and three political action committees, sought expedited review of FECA
provisions restricting their solicitation of funds for political purposes. Id. at 578-79. The Bread
Court refused to enlarge the three statutory classes of plaintiffs entitled to seek expedited review
of FECA provisions in order to include the petitioners. Id. at 584. O'Connor, however, stressed
the availability of a federal forum to litigate the petitioners' claim under other alternative
provisions of FECA or under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 without deciding whether the petitioners in fact
had standing under the alternative provisions. Id. at 584-85; see 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982)
(granting district courts original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under Constitution, laws,
or treaties of United States).
In addition to attacking judicial reliance on the particularized injury requirement, commentators also have criticized the Court's inclusion of causation as an element of standing analysis
when the plaintiff's failure to satisfy the causation component deprives the plaintiff of access
to the federal courts. See L. TRmE, supra note 24, § 3-21, at 94-97 (independent causation
requirement had no basis in case law prior to Warth v. Seldin); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 507, 509 (1975) (dismissing plaintiff's action because facts set out in complaint did
not establish causal link between challenged zoning practices and alleged injuries). See generally
Nichol, Causation as a Standing Requirement: The Unprincipled Use of Judicial Restraint, 69
Ky. L.J. 185 (1980) (criticizing Burger Court's development of causation component).
30. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
31. See id. at 100-01 (separation of powers considerations not involved in standing inquiry
whether plaintiff is proper party to present dispute to federal court); Nichol, Standing on the
Constitution, supra note 29, at 810 (noting Court's rejection in Flast of separation of powers
as basis for standing law).
32. See L. TRouE, supra note 24, § 3-7, at 52-53 (article III limitations on subject matter
jurisdiction define role of judicial branch). See generally Logan, supra note 29 (examining
standing law from separation of powers perspective).
33. Allen, 104 S. Ct. at 3325, 3329-30, 3330 n.26.
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status to allegedly discriminatory private schools. 34 The class, comprising
several million persons, complained that the IRS regulations and procedures
were not sufficient to implement the IRS policy of denying tax-exempt status
to discriminatory private schools.3 5 The class requested the federal court to
declare the IRS practices unlawful, to enjoin the IRS from granting taxexempt status to a class of private schools larger than the class described
under existing law, and to revise agency regulations to comply with the new
standards requested in the injunction. 6 O'Connor, writing for the majority,
recited the standing requirements constitutionally mandated under the present
Court's construction of the case or controversy language in article III. 37 In
the Court's view, standing law required the plaintiff-class in Allen to allege
that the class was injured, that the IRS had caused the class' injury, and
that judicial intervention in the implementation of IRS policy would redress
the plaintiffs' injury.38 According to O'Connor, the federal courts could not
intrude into the activities of another branch of government unless the
complaint provided a sufficient factual basis to justify such an intrusion. 9
In O'Connor's view, the determination of standing is not a "mechanical
exercise," but rather requires the Court to examine the pleadings to determine
whether the plaintiff has satisfied the article III standing requirements 0 Any
requirement that a plaintiff plead specific factual allegations before discovery
to satisfy the injury and causation components of standing, however, conflicts with the liberal notice pleading standard embodied in rule 8(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4' and adopted by the Court in Conley v.
42
Gibson.
The plaintiff-class in Allen alleged two injuries. 43 First, the plaintiff-class
alleged that the government had harmed the plaintiff-class by providing
34. Id. at 3319; see Note, Leading Cases of the 1983 Term: Standing-Injury-in-Fact
Requirements, 98 Hazv. L. REv. 236, 237-38 & nn.7-17 (1984) (briefly tracing background of
Allen lawsuit). See generally McCoy & Devins, Standing and Adverseness in Challenges of Tax
Exemptions for Discriminatory Private Schools, 52 Foans.sm L. REv. 441 (1984) (examining
taxpayer standing law immediately prior to Allen decision).
35. Allen, 104 S. Ct. at 3319, 3321.
36. Id. at 3322-23. In Allen v. Wright, the plaintiffs requested that the IRS deny tax
exempt status to all private schools with few or no minority students located in desegregated
public school districts that demonstrated either growth in enrollment during the period of public
school desegregation or practices of racial segregation, or that failed to establish that the school
did not provide educational facilities for children who wanted to avoid desegregated public
schools. Id.
37. Id. at 3325.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 3325, 3329.
40. Id. at 3325.
41. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (providing that pleading shall contain short and plain
statement of claim showing that pleader is entitled to relief).
42. See 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957) (endorsing rule 8(a) standard for notice pleadings). See
generally Roberts, Fact Pleading, Notice Pleading, and Standing, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 390
(1980) (discussing developing conflict between standing law and notice pleading).
43. Allen, 104 S. Ct. at 3325-26.
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financial aid in the form of tax exemptions to discriminatory private schools."
The Allen plaintiffs also alleged that the IRS' failure to deny tax-exempt
status to discriminatory private schools had impaired the right of the children
in the plaintiff-class to desegregated public education. 4 The Court held that
the plaintiffs' first claim, that the agency's granting tax-exempt status to
certain private schools harmed the plaintiffs, did not allege a judicially
cognizable injury regardless of whether the Court construed the first claim
as a demand for lawful government or as a claim of stigmatic injury shared
by all members of a race. 46 The Allen Court, therefore, dismissed the first
claim as not satisfying the particularized injury requirement. 4 The Court's
disposition of the plaintiffs' first claim in Allen strengthens the present
Court's controversial position that a shared public grievance stemming from
the government's violation of the law is not an injury within the meaning of
article 111.48
The Allen plaintiffs' second claim, that the IRS' failure to deny taxexempt status to certain schools affected the rights of minority children to
desegregated public education, according to the Court, did present a judicially
cognizable injury. 49 In O'Connor's view, however, the second claim failed
to meet the causation component of the standing requirements.50 O'Connor
treated the requirements that the plaintiff show that the defendant caused
the plaintiff's injury and that the judicial relief requested will remedy that
injury as two distinct aspects of the causation component.-" O'Connor noted
that the causal link between the conduct of the IRS and the class' alleged
injury must be clear and direct to overcome separation of powers concerns. 2
The Court, however, found that the plaintiffs in Allen did not satisfy either
aspect of causation.53 O'Connor found that the pleadings did not establish
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 3326-27.
47. Id. at 3327.
48. See id. at 3326-27 (citizens have no standing to complain simply of unlawful government); cf. supra note 29 (noting recent criticism of injury-in-fact requirement).
49. Allen, 104 S. Ct. at 3328.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 3326 n.19.
52. Id. at 3329, 3330 n.26.
53. Id. at 3328-29. But see Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151 (1981)
(O'Connor, J.). Writing for the majority in Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found., O'Connor
reached a different result from the result that the Court had reached in Allen on the issue of
redressability. See 454 U.S. at 162 (granting California standing to sue Secretary of Interior).
In Watt, the state of California complained that the Secretary of the Interior had failed to
experiment with more competitive bidding systems in awarding leases for oil and gas exploration
on the Outer Continental Shelf as required by statute. Id. at 161. The federal government
argued that even if the Secretary were to have experimented with alternative bidding systems,
California could not be certain that the system the state preferred would have been applied to
California tracts. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
had ordered the Secretary of the Interior to experiment with certain bidding systems. Id. at
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that the IRS' allegedly ineffective administration of tax regulations directly
caused the failure of desegregated public schools to attract significant num-

bers of white children nor that judicial enforcement of the tax laws would
result in an improved racial mix in the public schools. 54 The Court, therefore,
5
refused to grant standing to the plaintiff-class
Justice O'Connor's denial of standing in Allen resulted in a dismissal of
the suit and a clear signal to Congress and the executive branch that the

enforcement of IRS regulations is not the role of the judiciary.

6

In Allen,

O'Connor relied on Chicago & Grand Trunk Railway Co. v. Wellman 7 to
support her view that article III courts may act only under certain limited

circumstances." The dispute in Grand Trunk centered on the constitutionality
of a state statute regulating freight rates.5

9

The litigants had challenged the

statute in a friendly lawsuit tried on stipulated factsA0 The Grand Trunk
Court warned that litigants could not turn to the judiciary, absent a genuine

controversy, to challenge legislation after the parties' earlier attempts to
defeat the passage of the statute had failed in the legislature. 61 Likewise, in

O'Connor's view, individuals unhappy with an agency's implementation of
agency policy may not use the judiciary to enforce the policy absent a direct,
159. O'Connor, writing for the Court, however, ignored any separation of powers considerations
implicated by a federal court of appeals ordering the executive branch to implement the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendment absent California's showing that the court's action
would provide certain relief. See id. at 160-62 (O'Connor did not address separation of powers
considerations). O'Connor instead relied on the presumption that the agency, if compelled to
experiment with alternative bidding systems, would employ the most competitive bidding system
in a good faith effort to ensure the state of California the greatest return on leased tracts. Id.
at 162.
Despite an arguably more relaxed application of standing law in Watt, O'Connor generally
has opposed relaxation of standing requirements, prior to Allen, when standing was an issue
before the Court. See, e.g., Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 104 S. Ct.
2839, 2857 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (O'Connor joined dissent, which protested plaintiff's inappropriate use of overbreadth doctrine to establish standing); City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983) (O'Connor joined majority to deny plaintiff standing to seek
injunctive relief because plaintiff failed to show likelihood of future injury); Larson v. Valente,
456 U.S. 228, 264 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (O'Connor joined dissent, which argued
that plaintiff had burden to establish that judicial relief would remedy injury); Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,
482, 483, 486-87 (1982) (O'Connor joined majority to deny plaintiff standing to bring either
taxpayer's or citizen's suit against allegedly unconstitutional governmental action).
54. Allen, 104 S. Ct. at 3328-29, 3333.
55. Id. at 3333.
56. Id. at 3330; see McCoy & Devins, supra note 33, at 468-71 (describing congressional
inaction in face of judicial activism on tax-exempt issue).
57. 143 U.S. 339 (1892).
58. Allen, 104 S. Ct. at 3325; see Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry., 143 U.S. at 345 (plaintiffs
may challenge constitutionality of statute in federal court only as last resort).
59. Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry., 143 U.S. at 342.
60. Id. at 344.
61. Id. at 345.
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specific, and remediable injury.6 2 To the extent that Justice O'Connor relied
on separation of powers considerations to deny an aggrieved individual
access to the judiciary, O'Connor's opinion undercuts the premise that the
separation of powers doctrine implicitly protects individual freedoms. 63 Under
O'Connor's rule, plaintiffs who complain of unlawful governmental conduct
but who cannot meet the substantive and procedural requirements that the
Allen Court set forth must seek a remedy through the political process.
Effectively, the Allen decision shifted the plaintiffs' complaint from a
judicial forum into the political arena. Justice O'Connor, however, had
limited individual access to the political forum to influence policy matters in
her opinion for the majority in Minnesota State Board for Community
Colleges v. Knight.64 In Knight, the Court considered the constitutionality
of a state statute that allegedly prevented nonunion college faculty members
from participating in the selection of representatives to faculty committees
advising the state community college board on policy matters.65 The plaintiffs

62. Allen, 104 S. Ct. at 3330. O'Connor stated in Allen that the Constitution delegated
the duty to enforce the laws to the executive branch, and not to judiciary. Id. In Allen,
O'Connor refused to intrude into the daily operations of the Internal Revenue Service to enforce
administrative agency policies toward discriminatory private schools. See id. at 3329-30 (general
oversight of executive branch is not proper role for judiciary). O'Connor, however, has not
waived judicial control over administrative agencies. According to O'Connor, the function of
judicial review of administrative agencies is to determine whether an agency's action falls within
the agency's statutory powers. See Baltimore Gas and Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983) (O'Connor, J.) (Congress assigned courts only limited
role of reviewing agency action to determine whether action is authorized by statute). Moreover,
O'Connor will assert the Court's power to check any administrative action that, in her view,
Congress did not intend. See, e.g., ICC v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 2458,
2468-72 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (judicial precedent and legislative history provide no
basis for doctrine of inherent agency power); EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 104 S. Ct. 1621, 1643
(1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (EEOC's failure to provide
informative notice to employer of charges filed with EEOC defeated congressional purpose of
fostering voluntary compliance with Title VII); NLRB v. City Disposal Sys. Inc., 104 S. Ct.
1505, 1517 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (NLRB exercised undelegated legislative power by
extending its jurisdiction in effort to enforce individual contract rights secured by collective
bargaining agreements); Commissioner v. Engle, 104 S. Ct. 597, 608-09 (1984) (O'Connor, J.)
(Commissioner's interpretation of statute governing tax deductions for income from oil and gas
leases was unreasonable in light of congressional intent to encourage .further production);
Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of the City of New York, 463 U.S. 582, 612-15 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (agency regulations to implement Title VI were invalid in O'Connor's
view because regulations did not require showing of purposeful discrimination intended by
Congress).
63. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (suggesting that potential conflict may arise
from restricting individual access to federal courts on separation of powers grounds).
64. 104 S. Ct. 1058 (1984).
65. Id. at 1060. In Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, certain faculty
members challenged the constitutionality of a Minnesota labor law that limited the plaintiffs'
participation in policy-making meetings within the state community college system. Id. at 1063.
In Minnesota, the Public Employment Labor Relations Act (PELRA) governed the relationships
between all public employers and their employees. Id. at 1060. PELRA provided that each
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in Knight claimed that the state of Minnesota had created a forum for
faculty advice and input regarding the administration of the Minnesota
community college system through enactment of the Public Employment
Labor Relations Act (PELRA).66 The plaintiffs further alleged that the
Minnesota Community College Faculty Association (MCCFA), the exclusive
bargaining agent for all community college faculty, and the Minnesota State
Board for Community Colleges (the Board), the governing agency for the
Minnesota community college system, had denied the plaintiffs access to this
forum based solely on the plaintiffs' failure to join MCCFA.67 The plaintiffs
argued that although the state had no obligation to create a forum for
debate, once the state in fact had created such a forum, discriminatory
application of the statute to limit access to that forum for certain public
employees violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend6
ment.
The Knight Court, in its statement of the issue presented, did not clarify
the specific constitutional provision that provided the basis for the plaintiffs'
challenge, 69 but proceeded to consider the complaint under the first and
bargaining unit must choose an exclusive bargaining agent who also would serve as the unit's
only representative in informal policy meetings. Id. The statute barred employers from meeting
with any other employee representatives. Id. at 1061. The Minnesota State Board for Community
Colleges (Board) managed the Minnesota community college system and was a public employer
within the meaning of PELRA. Id. The Minnesota Community College Faculty Association
(MCCFA) was the exclusive bargaining agent for all faculty within the Minnesota community
college system. Id. Because not all faculty members belonged to the MCCFA, a controversy
arose when the MCCFA selected only its own members to participate in committee meetings
designed to negotiate collective bargaining agreements and to advise the Board on policy matters.
Id. at 1062. The faculty members who were not members of the MCCFA filed suit to challenge
the constitutionality of the MCCFA's exclusive representation of the faculty in collective
bargaining sessions and in policy discussions. Id. at 1063. The district court upheld the
constitutionality of PELRA's provisions requiring exclusive representation in the collective
bargaining negotiations. See Knight v. Minnesota Community College Faculty Ass'n, 571 F.
Supp. 1, 3-7 (D. Minn. 1982) (rejecting plaintiffs' arguments that MCCFA properly may not
negotiate labor contract on behalf of state employees), aff'd, 460 U.S. 1048 (1983). The district
court, however, determined that PELRA as applied by the MCCFA infringed the first amendment rights of faculty members who were not members of the MCCFA. 571 F. Supp. at 9-10
& n.20. In a modified remedial decree, the district court ordered the MCCFA to permit
cumulative voting to afford non-member faculty an increased opportunity to represent their
views on the MCCFA's advisory policy committees. See 104 S. Ct. at 1063 n.5 (acknowledging
remedy ordered by district court). The Board appealed from the remedial order. See Brief for
Appellees, No. 82-898, at i, Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 104 S. Ct.
1058 (1984) (question presented to Court endorsed propriety of cumulative voting remedy)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellees]. But see Knight, 104 S. Ct. at 1063 n.5 (no need to
reach question of remedy since PELRA upheld as constitutional).
66. Brief for Appellees, supra note 65, at 3-4.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 5.
69. See Knight, 104 S. Ct. at 1060 (O'Connor stating question presented as whether
limitations on certain employees' participation in policy discussions violated their constitutional
rights); id. at 1063 (O'Connor stating issue before lower federal court without reference to any
specific constitutional provision).
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fourteenth amendments. 70 O'Connor, writing for the Court, construed the
plaintiffs' complaint as advancing a constitutional right to be heard by state
officials. 71 O'Connor rejected the district court's reasoning that Minnesota
must afford a fair opportunity to non-MCCFA members to participate in a
state-created forum intended to encourage debate. 72 O'Connor held that
neither the first amendment nor any other constitutional provision could
support a right to participate in governmental policy making.7 3 From the
perspective of separation of powers, enforcement of a constitutional right to
be heard, in O'Connor's view, would require impermissible intrusion into
the executive and legislative branches of government.74 According to O'Connor, the state may choose to whom it listens, if it chooses to seek advice at
all. 75 Moreover, in O'Connor's view, neither the exclusive representation
provisions of PELRA nor PELRA's implementation by MCCFA violated
the plaintiffs' first amendment rights of free speech or association. 76 Having
found no fundamental value at stake, O'Connor reviewed the contested

PELRA provisions under the rational basis test in light of the plaintiffs'
equal protection challenge and found that the PELRA provisions requiring
the selection of exclusive representatives for informal policy discussions
70. Id. at 1064-70.

71. Id. at 1065. In Knight, the plaintiffs had argued that their right to participate in the
selection of representatives to PELRA advisory policy committees arose under PELRA, not the
Constitution. Brief for Appellees, supra note 65, at 5.
72. Knight, 104 S. Ct. at 1065; see Knight v. Minnesota Community College Faculty
Ass'n, 571 F. Supp. 1, 9-10 (D. Minn. 1982) (holding that state must provide fair opportunity
for all faculty to participate in selection of faculty representatives to advisory committees).
73. Knight, 104 S. Ct. at 1066, 1068 n.10. In Knight, O'Connor relied on Bi-Metallic Inv.
Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization to support her stringent rejection of a constitutional right to
be heard. Id. at 1065-66; see Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441,
445 (1915) (holding that no individual has right to be heard in state administrative hearing).
74. Knight, 104 S. Ct. at 1066.
75. Id. at 1066-67, 1068.
76. Id. at 1068. In Knight, although the plaintiffs did not argue that informal committee
meetings were a public forum, O'Connor foreclosed any future claim that such committee
meetings are a public forum or a non-public forum deserving first amendment protection. Id.
at 1064-65; see Brief for Appellees, supra note 65, at 3-4 (conceding that, absent PELRA,
Constitution does not require Minnesota to maintain public forum for policy discussion).
Professor Farber and Nowak note that a traditional public forum is a sidewalk or park, whereas
a nonpublic forum may include government property not normally open to the public. Farber
& Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First
Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REv. 1219, 1220-21, 1221 n.12 (1984); see Note, The

Public Forum and the First Amendment: The Puzzle of the Podium, 19 NEw ENG. L. Rv.
619, 628 & n.60, 631-32 (1984) (referring to public property like schools, jails, libraries, and
courthouses as nontraditional rather than nonpublic forums). Farber and Nowak point out that
the Supreme Court has classified the type of forum to which a plaintiff desires access in
analyzing first amendment challenges to content regulation of speech. Farber & Nowak, supra,
at 1220. Farber and Nowak claim that the degree of scrutiny will vary depending upon the
nature of the forum. See id. at 1220-21 (regulation of speech in public forum more closely
scrutinized than regulation in nonpublic forum). These commentators, however, claim that use
of public forum analysis displaces a discussion of the particular first amendment values involved
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served legitimate state interests. 7 Implicitly, therefore, O'Connor found no
first amendment rights attaching to a statutorily created forum. Furthermore,
O'Connor found that those who are denied access to the forum have no
enforceable equal protection claim when the limitations on access serve
legitimate state interests.
Justice O'Connor's sensitivity to separation of powers considerations,
which compelled the dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint in Allen 78 and
supported her refusal to recognize a constitutional right to be heard in
Knight,7 9 is also implicit in O'Connor's deference to Congress' power to
limit the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. 80 For example, in South

in a case. Id. at 1224. Farber and Nowak have criticized O'Connor's public forum analysis in
Knight, in particular, as failing to consider the possible first amendment implications of PELRA.
Id. at 1257-61.
In Knight, however, O'Connor implicitly found that the first amendment tolerated government preferring one voice over another in the context of governmental policy making. See
Knight, 104 S. Ct. at 1068 (amplification of single official voice is result of government's
freedom to listen to whomever it chooses). Additionally, O'Connor found that MCCFA's ability
to exclude dissenting voices did not threaten any constitutional values. Id. Under the rule in
Knight, government violates no constitutional principles in affording individuals little or no
access to policy making bodies. See id. at 1066-67 (O'Connor '%oting that persons may express
disapproval of public policy at polls); cf. Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1366 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring). In Lynch v. Donnelly, decided one month after Knight, O'Connor
concurred in the majority's determination that the City of Pawtucket did not violate the
establishment clause by displaying a creche during the Christmas season. 104 S. Ct. at 1366;
see id. (majority holding creche display did not violate establishment clause). In considering the
dangers of governmental involvement in religion, O'Connor claimed that government endorsement of a particular religious view conveyed to the public that the government preferred the
views of certain citizens over others. Id. In O'Connor's view, such preference violated the
establishment clause. Id. The appearance of preferring one view over another seemed less
troubling to O'Connor in Knight in the context of a statutorily created forum to debate policy.
See Knight, 104 S. Ct. at 1068 (government's preference of MCCFA view did not violate first
amendment because, in O'Connor's view, excluded persons still could exercise freedom of
speech). In Knight, however, religious entanglement was not a factor. See Knight, 104 S. Ct.
at 1064-70 (Court addressing access to political policy making organs of government only).
77. Knight, 104 S. Ct. at 1069-70.
78. See supra notes 22-63 and accompanying text (discussion of separation of powers
concerns in Allen).
79. See supranote 74 and accompanying text (discussion of separation of powers concerns
in Knight).
80. See, e.g., Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 104 S. Ct. 2450, 2458 (1984) (O'Connor, J.) (federal court had no jurisdiction to review agency action because Congress precluded
judicial review); Justices of Boston Mun. Court v. Lyon, 104 S. Ct. 1805, 1829-30 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (Court should have found that federal court lacked jurisdiction to
hear habeas petition because defendant was not in custody within meaning of federal statute);
California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 396 (1982) (O'Connor, J.) (Tax Injunction
Act deprived federal court of jurisdiction to enjoin collection of state taxes); cf. South Carolina
v. Regan, 104 S. Ct. 1107, 1118-19 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (Court should hold that
Anti-Injunction Act deprived district court of jurisdiction to hear all suits for injunctive relief
from collection of federal taxes).
Article III provides, in part, that federal judicial power shall be vested in the Supreme
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Carolina v. Regan,"l O'Connor, writing separately, affirmed Congress' constitutional authority to deprive federal courts of the power to enjoin the
collection of federal taxes.12 The dispute in Regan arose over the application
of the federal Anti-Injunction Act83 to South Carolina's claim that an
amendment to the Internal Revenue Code (Code) affecting South Carolina's
issuance of bonds violated the tenth amendment 4 The Regan majority
construed the Anti-Injunction Act as barring only the suits of those plaintiffs
who could seek relief through means other than a suit for an injunction such
as a taxpayer refund suit."5 Because the state of South Carolina itself did
not become liable for any taxes as a result of the Code amendment, the state
of South Carolina had no means other than a suit for injunctive relief by
which to challenge the provision. The Regan Court, therefore, held that the
Anti-Injunction Act did not bar South Carolina's lawsuit.16 In a separate
concurrence, O'Connor disagreed with the majority's construction of the

Court, and in lower federal courts as Congress may create from time to time. U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 1. Congress' exercise of its power to limit the jurisdiction of lower federal courts is wellestablished. NowAK, supra note 18, at 46-47; Bator, CongressionalPower Over the Jurisdiction
of the Federal Courts, 27 ViLL. L. REv. 1030, 1030-38 (1982). Additionally, Article III grants
Congress the power to limit the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 2. Controversy has arisen, however, concerning Congress' power to withdraw the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction over a particular subject matter. See Bator, supra, at 1038-41
(arguing that although Congress has power to withdraw Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction
to give state courts original jurisdiction over constitutional issues, such removal of appellate
jurisdiction would violate spirit of Constitution). See generally Gunther, CongressionalPower
to CurtailFederalCourt Jurisdiction:An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STA.
L. REv. 895 (1984) (describing debate over extent of congressional power to withdraw Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction over entire classes of cases).
81. 104 S. Ct. 1107, 1118 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).

82. Id. at 1118-19, 1123-24; see 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (1982) (Anti-Injunction Act) (providing
in relevant part that no person may maintain suit in any court to restrain assessment or collection
of any tax). Federal courts generally enforce the federal Anti-Injunction Act to bar taxpayer
suits to enjoin tax collection when the aggrieved taxpayers have an alternative remedy. See
NowAK, supra note 18, at 48. The dispute in South Carolinav. Regan arose when the Treasury
Department invoked the Anti-Injunction Act to bar a suit for injunctive relief by a nontaxpayer
who had no alternative forum in which to seek relief. 104 S. Ct. at 1110; see 26 U.S.C. §
7421(a) (applying by its terms to all persons regardless of availability of alternative remedy).
83. 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (1982).
84. Regan, 104 S. Ct. at 1110-11; see U.S. CoNsT. amend. X (providing that powers not
delegated to federal government are reserved to states or to people). In Regan, the challenged
amendment to the Internal Revenue Code permitted the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to tax
the interest earned on certain bonds issued by the states in bearer form. 104 S. Ct. at 1110-11.
South Carolina challenged the constitutionality of the taxing provision under the tenth amendment as infringing on South Carolina's borrowing power. Id. at 1111; see U.S. CONsT. amend.
X. South Carolina argued that the state no longer had an option to issue bearer bonds because
South Carolina would have to pay a higher rate of interest to holders of bearer bonds than to
holders of registered bonds to defray the tax liability that the bond holders would incur under
the challenged taxing provision. 104 S. Ct. at 1111.
85. Regan, 104 S. Ct. at 1111-15.
86. Id. at 1116.
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Anti-Injunction Act.8 7 In O'Connor's view, the explicit language of the Act
barred suits by taxpayers and nontaxpayers alike. 8 O'Connor recognized no

due process problem in barring South Carolina's suit under the AntiInjunction Act because the state was not a person and did not have a
property right at stake within the meaning of the due process clause of the

fifth amendment. 89 O'Connor, however, construed the Act to allow the
Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction to provide a forum for
South Carolina's claim. 90
Justice O'Connor in her Regan concurrence addressed the serious constitutional issue raised by the government whether the Anti-Injunction Act

limited the original jurisdiction of the Court. 9' O'Connor differentiated
Congress' power to regulate lower federal courts from its power to affect
the appellate and original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 92 Although the
Constitution permits Congress to impose restrictions on the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 93 O'Connor noted that the Constitution is
silent concerning the power of Congress to revise the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction. 94 By construing the Act's failure to limit specifically the

Supreme Court's original jurisdiction as congressional acceptance of the
Supreme Court's power to provide a forum through exercise of the Court's

original jurisdiction, O'Connor avoided the important constitutional issue
she had raised. 9 Considering the Court's role in relation to congressional

prerogatives, O'Connor respected in the federal Anti-Injunction Act a clear
legislative limitation on the jurisdiction of the federal district courts. 96 In the
course of her concurrence in Regan, however, O'Connor acknowledged due
87. Id. at 1118 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 1118-19; see 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (1982) (statute applies whether or not plaintiff
is one against whom government assessed tax).
89. Regan, 104 S. Ct. at 1122-23.
90. Id. at 1126-27.
91. Id. at 1123.
92. Id. at 1123-24.
93. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Article III provides, in part, that the Supreme Court shall
have appellate jurisdiction except as Congress shall limit. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2.
94. Regan, 104 S. Ct. at 1124; see U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2 (granting Supreme Court
original jurisdiction to hear cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
and cases in which state is party).
95. Regan, 104 S. Ct. at 1125-26.
96. See id. at 1118-22 (Congress intended to bar all suits to enjoin collection of federal
taxes whether initiated by taxpayers or nontaxpayers); see also California v. Grace Brethren
Church, 457 U.S. 393, 417 (1982) (O'Connor, J.). In California v. Grace Brethren Church,
religious schools unaffiliated with any church claimed that federal and state statutes requiring
religious schools to make contributions to state unemployment compensation funds violated the
establishment and free exercise clauses of the first amendment. 457 U.S. at 396-98. O'Connor,
writing for the majority in Grace, held that the Tax Injunction Act deprived the federal court
of jurisdiction to hear the dispute. Id. at 407-11. The Tax Injunction Act prohibited any district
court from enjoining, suspending, or restraining the assessment or collection of state taxes when
the taxpayer had a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy in state court. Tax Injunction Act, 28
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process 97 and original jurisdiction98 as two potential constitutional limitations

on Congress' power to deny plaintiffs access to a federal forum.
In addition to Justice O'Connor's recognition of the restraints that standing doctrine and Congress' power to limit jurisdiction impose on the federal
judiciary, signs of judicial restraint also are appearing in O'Connor's view of
the proper exercise of remedial discretion when plaintiffs seek equitable reme-

dies in federal court. O'Connor's attempts to limit the discretionary remedial
power of federal courts have occurred primarily in cases in which plaintiffs seek
relief under federal statutes for discriminatory practices in the workplace. 99 In
particular, O'Connor has favored restraint when allegedly discriminatory emU.S.C. § 1341 (1982). In Grace, the Court extended the prohibition against injunctions to
include the issuance of declaratory judgments that state taxing laws were unconstitutional. 457
U.S. at 408-11, 409 n.22. Moreover, O'Connor writing for the Court found that the California
state court had afforded Grace Brethren an opportunity to litigate its constitutional claim. Id.
at 411-17. The Grace Court, therefore, refused to permit Grace Brethren to raise its first
amendment claim in federal court because to permit such an exception, in O'Connor's view,
would defeat Congress' purpose of sharply curtailing federal court disruption of state tax
administration when state remedies were available. Id. at 416-17. The dissent in Grace complained that dismissal of the suit for lack of jurisdiction was unwarranted because Grace
Brethren sued the Department of Labor in addition to the state taxing authorities to challenge
a federal-state cooperative program established under federal law. Id. at 419-21 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Although the Grace dissent criticized the majority's expansive construction of the
Tax Injunction Act to prohibit declaratory judgments as judicial legislating, at least one
commentator has viewed O'Connor's strict enforcement of the Tax Injunction Act as further
support for the present Court's commitment to federal judicial restraint. Id. at 421-22; see
Note, Supreme Court Decisions in Taxation-1981 Term: Prohibition of Federal Declaratory
Relief Regarding State Tax Under Tax Injunction Act: California v. Grace Brethren Church,
36 TAx. LAw. 485, 486, 494-95 (1983) (enforcement of Tax Injunction Act furthers policy of
judicial restraint).
97. See Regan, 104 S. Ct. at 1122-23 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (due process prevents
Congress from wholly denying forum to taxpayer with property interests at stake). One scholar
has observed that the due process clause of the fifth amendment limits congressional restrictions
on federal court jurisdiction. NowAK, supra note 18, at 46-47. Professors Bator and Gunther,
however, have noted that the availability of a state forum to litigate federal constitutional rights
satisfies the due process safeguard. See Bator, supra note 80, at 1033-34; Gunther, supra note
80, at 915-16. But cf. Redish, Constitutional Limitations on CongressionalPower to Control
Federal Jurisdiction:A Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 Nw. U.L. Rv. 143, 161-66 (1982)
(acknowledging capacity of state courts to litigate federal constitutional claims, but noting lack
of independence of state court judges as possible basis for due process challenge to congressional
attempts wholly to withdraw jurisdiction from federal courts). In alluding to due process
considerations arising from congressional withdrawal of federal court jurisdiction, Justice
O'Connor in Regan did not address the extent to which the availability of state courts alone
would satisfy due process. See 104 S. Ct. at 1122-23 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting only
that Congress may not deprive person with property interest access to judicial forum).
98. Regan, 104 S. Ct. at 1125. Although O'Connor in Regan did not decide the extent of
congressional power over the Court's original jurisdiction, she cast doubt on the authority of
Congress to deprive states of a federal forum. See id. (Congress may not withdraw express
constitutional grant of original jurisdiction).
99. See Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2567, 2592-94 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (concurring in majority's decision to limit discretion of district court
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ployers voluntarily comply with federal standards'00 and when the rights of into

modify Title VII consent decree entered into between minority-plaintiffs and allegedly
discriminatory employer); Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred
Compensation Plans v. Norris, 103 S. Ct. 3492, 3511-13 (1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(disapproving retroactive award of retirement benefits to female employees who had successfully
challenged, under Title VII, insurance industry practice of distributing less per month to women
in retirement benefits than paid to men based solely on longer average life span of women);
Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 238-39 (1982) (O'Connor, J.) (limiting discretion of
district court to grant back pay awards when employer charged with violating Title VII
voluntarily offered discriminatee job initially denied); cf. Sure-tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 104 S. Ct.
2803, 2812-16 (1984) (O'Connor, J.) (limiting discretion of courts of appeals to alter NLRB
remedial order); Heckler v. Blankenship, 104 S. Ct. 966, 967 (O'Connor, Circuit Justice 1984)
(approving grant of certiorari to consider propriety of district court's ruling placing time limits
on administrative agency adjudication and appeals process). But see General Bldg. Contractors
Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 403 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring). In GeneralBldg.
ContractorsAss'n v. Pennsylvania, the state of Pennsylvania and several black individuals
brought suit against trade associations, employers, and a union that allegedly followed a pattern
and practice of discriminatory hiring. 458 U.S. at 380. The employers and trade associations
appealed a lower court finding that the employers were liable for the discriminatory practices
of the union under § 1981. Id. at 381-82; see 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982) (providing for equal
rights under law for all persons). The Supreme Court reversed the district court's determination
that the employers were vicariously liable for the discriminatory practices of the union. 458
U.S. at 382. The GeneralBldg. ContractorsCourt held that, absent a showing that an employer
was liable, a federal court could not require the employer to share in the costs and administration
of a remedial program. Id. at 398-400. The Court stated, however, that a party not liable for
unlawful conduct could be required to implement minor ancillary provisions of an injunction.
Id. at 399. O'Connor concurred in the majority's opinion but wrote separately to address the
scope of the equitable powers of the Court. Id. at 404 (O'Connor, J., concurring). O'Connor
stressed the Court's concession that, in certain circumstances, a federal court could require an
employer, not liable for discriminatory practices, to help the court determine the effects of an
injunction. Id. at 404-05. O'Connor relied on the Supreme Court's use of rule 19(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in InternationalBhd. of Teamsters v. United States. Id. at
405 n.3; see International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 356 n.43 (1977)
(retaining union in lawsuit to provide complete relief to victims of discriminatory practices
despite finding that union was not liable); see also FED. R. CIrv. P. 19(a). Rule 19(a) provides,
in relevant part, that a person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not
deprive the court of jurisdiction shall be joined if in his absence complete relief is not possible.
FED. R. CIrv. P. 19(a). Prior to General Bldg. Contractors,however, the lower federal courts
had used rule 19(a) to join only a union whose collective bargaining agreement with a
discriminatory employer would be affected by the outcome of litigation. See, e.g., EEOC v.
MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 503 F.2d 1086, 1096 (6th Cir. 1974) (cited by Teamsters
Court as authority for use of rule 19(a)) (joinder of union based on union's contractual ties to
discriminatory employer); Marshall v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 364, 366 (S.D. Fla.
1979) (joining labor organization based on its contractual relationship to violating employer),
aff'd, 645 F.2d 69 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 818 (1981); Coker v. Marmon Group, Inc.,
455 F. Supp. 398, 401 (D.S.C. 1978) (EEOC may join union because litigation might affect
collective bargaining agreement); Braxton v. Virginia Folding Box Co., 72 F.R.D. 124, 127
(E.D. Va. 1976) (joinder of nonparticipating union was permissible because union had signed
collective bargaining agreement that might be affected by litigation). O'Connor's reliance on
rule 19(a) to retain an employer rather than a union in General Bldg. Contractors draws
attention to the potential use of a procedural rule to require litigants who have not violated the
law to participate in an ancillary way in the federal court's fashioning of equitable relief.
100. See Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 228-29 (1982) (tolling discriminatory
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nocent third parties may be affected by equitable remedies.' 0 For example, in
FordMotor Co. v. EEOC,0 2 O'Connor, writing for the majority, stated that

federal courts must respect the remedial policies behind federal legislation and
must limit a plaintiff's relief if the judiciary's grant of complete retroactive relief would undermine Congress' purposes in enacting the statute. 3 In Ford, the
Supreme Court considered whether Ford Motor Co. (Ford) had tolled its
backpay liability under Title VII by making an offer of employment without

retroactive seniority to women against whom Ford allegedly had discriminated. 104 O'Connor reasoned that because an award of backpay is an equitable discretionary remedy and because the Court may exercise its discretion only

in accordance with the policies behind the remedial legislation, the Court first
must set out the objectives of Title VII as guidelines for the award of back
pay. 105 In O'Connor's view, Congress' primary purpose in enacting Title VII
was to end discrimination in the workplace,'0 6 and an award of backpay,

employer's backpay liability provides incentive for discriminatory employer to hire Title VII
plaintiff).
101. See Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2593 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (federal courts may provide preferential treatment for discriminatees
only after balancing interests of discriminatees, employers, and innocent third-party employees);
Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation Plans v.
Norris, 103 S. Ct. 3492, 3512 (1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (rejecting retroactive award of
retirement benefits because such awards might jeopardize funds owed to innocent third parties);
Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 239-40 (1982) (O'Connor, J.) (federal courts should
not endorse any rule that requires innocent workers to sacrifice seniority to complainants before
complainants prove actual discrimination).
102. 458 U.S. 219 (1982) (O'Connor, J.).
103. Id. at 226-30.
104. Id. at 220. In Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, three women, Judy Gaddis, Rebecca Starr,
and Vettie Smith, unsuccessfully had applied for jobs in Ford Motor Co. (Ford) warehouse.
Id. at 221-22. Gaddis filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), claiming that Ford had refused to hire her solely because of her sex. Id. at 222. Six
months after Gaddis and Starr had accepted employment with General Motors Corp. (GM) in
a GM warehouse, Ford offered Gaddis and Starr, in turn, a job in the Ford warehouse without
retroactive seniority. Id. Each refused Ford's offer. Id. GM subsequently laid off both Gaddis
and Starr. Id. Unable to find new jobs, Gaddis and Starr eventually entered a government
training program. Id. Smith, the third woman Ford initially had refused to hire, worked
elsewhere following Ford's refusal to hire her but did not earn wages comparable to those Ford
generally offered. Id. at 222-23. In 1975, the EEOC sued Ford for violating Title VII in its
hiring practices. Id. at 223. The EEOC requested, among other concessions, that Ford provide
backpay to various claimants including Gaddis, Starr, and Smith. Id. at 223 & n.5.
105. Id. at 226-28.
106. Id. at 228. In Ford, O'Connor relied on Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody for the
proposition that the primary purpose of Title VII was to end discrimination. Id.; see Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975) (primary objective of Title VII is to achieve
equality in work place). The Albemarle Court, however, identified another objective, the
remedial goal of providing complete relief for the victim of discrimination. 422 U.S. at 418.
The Supreme Court in addressing Title VII often has recognized that the compensatory goal of
Title VII is as important as the goal of ending discrimination. See, e.g., General Tel. Co. of
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therefore, must serve that purpose. 0 7 According to O'Connor, allowing
employers to toll back pay liability by offering discriminatees the employment
initially denied is consistent with the legislative objective of Title VIIV' S
O'Connor rejected the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's argument that any subsequent offer of employment must include retroactive seniority.109 By relegating to a secondary position Title VII's purpose of providing
complete relief to victims of discrimination, O'Connor limited the federal district courts' discretion to grant comprehensive back pay awards when employers charged with violations of Title VII subsequently offered employment
opportunities to the discriminatees.
Although Justice O'Connor has resisted expansion of the role of the
federal judiciary as a coordinate branch of government, O'Connor's efforts
to restrain the scope of the federal judiciary are evidenced most clearly in
her approach to judicial review of state court judgments and of state
legislation. O'Connor commonly relies on the principles of federalism to
justify judicial restraint. 10 Federalism encompasses respect for the individual
interests of the states and of the federal government, and is implicit in the
Constitution's division of power between the federal government and the
states."' For example, the Constitution delegates certain enumerated powers
to Congress" 2 and reserves all undelegated powers to the states through the

the Northwest, Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 332 (1980) (noting strong congressional intent to
provide complete make-whole relief under Title VII); City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water and
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 719 (1978) (statutory purposes of Title VII are to end
discrimination and to make victims whole); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 364 (1977) (equally important purpose of Title VII is to provide complete relief).
Under the rule in Albemarle, a court could deny backpay awards only when the denial would
not frustrate either of the dual purposes of Title VII. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 421. In Ford,
however, O'Connor relegated the compensatory goal of Title VII to a secondary position. Ford,
458 U.S. at 230. But cf. Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred
Compensation Plans v. Norris, 103 S. Ct. 3492, 3502 (1983) (per curiam) (Norris plurality
continued to advocate equally important compensatory goal of Title VII).
107. Ford, 458 U.S. at 228.
108. Id. at 228-29.
109. Id. at 229.
110. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005, 103334 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (essence of federalism is that states have legitimate interests
that federal government must recognize); Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v.
Knight, 104 S. Ct. 1058, 1066 (1984) (O'Connor, J.) (judicial enforcement of constitutional
right to be heard impermissibly threatens federalism); Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3496, 347477 (1983) (O'Connor, J.) (construing independent and adequate state grounds rule with attention
to state-federal relations); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 787-91 (1982) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (forcing states to consider federal standards undercuts
federalism).
I 11. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 45-46 (J. Madison) (recognizing significant powers remaining
in states under Constitution).
112. U.S. CONST. art. I; see L. TRNEB,
federal government of limited powers).

supra note 24, § 5-2, at 225 (Constitution created
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tenth amendment." 3 One such enumerated power that the Constitution grants
to Congress is the authority to regulate interstate commerce." 4 Congress'
exercise of the commerce power often has drawn national and state interests
into sharp conflict." 5 Since the 1930's, the Supreme Court has permitted
6
increased federal regulation of state activity under the commerce clause."
7
In the 1976 decision of National League of Cities v. Usery, " however, the
Supreme Court recognized a constitutional limitation on Congress' exercise

of its broad commerce power to regulate state activity." 8 The National

League of Cities Court held that any federal legislation that displaced the
states' management of traditional governmental functions exceeded Congress'
power under the commerce clause." 9 Commentators generally have regarded
National League of Cities as invoking the tenth amendment as the source of

a judicially enforceable limitation protecting the states from unwarranted
federal interference. 20
113. U.S. CONST. amend. X; see supra note 84 (noting text of tenth amendment).
114. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3. Article I provides, in part, that Congress shall have
the power to regulate interstate commerce. U.S. CoNsr. art. I.
115. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005, 1009 (1985)
(municipal transit authority seeks to avoid federal regulation of pay scale); FERC v. Mississippi,
456 U.S. 742, 752-53 (1982) (state utility commission challenged federal requirement that state
agencies consider proposed federal standards and implement certain regulations).
116. See L. TRIE, supra note 24, § 5-4, at 233-36 (briefly tracing Court's approach to
commerce power from 1824 to present); Note, The HistoricalStruggle Between the Commerce
Clause and the Tenth Amendment Continues: EEOC v. Wyoming, I1 Omo N.U. L. REv. 231,
231 n.5 (1984) (contrasting earlier Court decisions limiting commerce power with more recent
Court decisions expanding Congress' power under commerce clause).
117. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
118. Id. at 842-45. In NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery, the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938 (FLSA) provided that certain employers comply with minimum wage and overtime
provisions. Id. at 835-36, 835 n.l. In 1974, Congress amended the FLSA to include most state
employers. Id. at 836. Various cities, states, the National League of Cities, and the National
Governors' Conference filed suit against the Secretary of Labor, alleging that the amended
FLSA provisions exceeded the power of Congress to regulate states under the commerce clause.
Id. at 836-37. The National League of Cities Court recognized the plenary power of Congress
under the commerce clause to regulate the private sector. Id. at 840. The Court, however,
viewed regulation of states as implicating constitutional principles of state sovereignty that
limited the otherwise proper exercise of the commerce power. Id. at 842-45. The Court,
therefore, held that the application of the wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA to states
exceeded Congress' power under the commerce clause to the extent that the wage and overtime
provision affected the states' performance of traditional governmental functions. Id. at 852.
119. Id. at 852. The Court's decision in National League of Cities has been subject to
widespread criticism. See Comment, When the Walls Come Tumbling Down: What Remains of
National League of Cities?, 53 U. CN. L. REv. 625, 625 & n.2 (1984) (exhaustive listing of
critical commentary concerning NationalLeague of Cities decision). See generally Frickey, Stare
Decisis in Constitutional Cases: ReconsideringNational League of Cities, 2 CONST. COMMENTARY
123 (1985) (calling for Court to overrule National League of Cities in then pending case of
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth.).
120. See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 842-43 (tenth amendment limits Congress'
commerce power). Commentators generally regard National League of Cities as designating the
tenth amendment as the textual source of enforceable judicial limitations on Congress' exercise
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Justice O'Connor's view of state sovereignty within the federal system
m
has emerged in her dissents from the Court's decisions in FERC v. Mississippi
and Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,'22 in which the
Court upheld federal regulations challenged under the principles articulated
in National League of Cities. In FERC, the state of Mississippi and the
Mississippi Public Service Commission filed suit against the Secretary of
Energy and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), alleging
that certain provisions of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA)
exceeded Congress' authority under the commerce clause and violated the
tenth amendment. 23 The FERC Court found that federal regulation of
electric and gas utilities was a proper exercise of the commerce power and
that no challenged provision of PURPA unduly threatened state sovereignty
of it commerce power. See, e.g., NowAK, supra note 18, at 170-71, 172-73 (National League
of Cities relied on tenth amendment to limit Congress' power); Note, National League of Cities
v. Usery to EEOC v. Wyoming: Evolution of a Balancing Approach to Tenth Amendment
Analysis, 1984 DutE L.J. 601, 603 (National League of Cities relied oh tenth amendment to
limit delegated powers).
Justice Rehnquist, in the course of his opinion for the majority in National League of
Cities, however, referred only once to the tenth amendment. 426 U.S. at 842-43. Rehnquist
instead relied on more general principles of state sovereignty underlying the Constitution as the
basis for limiting the reach of federal legislation under the commerce clause. Id. at 843 n.14,
844-45, 849, 852; see L. TRiBE, supra note 24, § 5-22, at 308 n.9 (finding National League of
Cities unclear on basis of limitation). See generally Engdahl, Sense and Nonsense About State
Immunity, 2 CONST. COmmENTARY 93 (1985) (necessary and proper clause provides constitutional
basis for state immunity doctrine). Professor Tribe argues that reliance on the tenth amendment
does not support the distinction drawn in National League of Cities between federal regulation
of the private and public sectors. L. TRmE, supra note 24, § 5-22, at 308 n.9. Professor Engdahl
argues that National League of Citieswas a case involving the necessary and proper clause, not
the tenth amendment. Engdahl, supra, at 93. In Engdahl's view, the tenth amendment grants
no immunity to state government, but rather acknowledges that the people have granted
governing powers to state and national governments within a federal system. Id. at 99.
121. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
122. 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
123. FERC, 456 U.S. at 752. In FERC v. Mississippi,the Public Utility Regulatory Policies
Act of 1978 (PURPA) required, in part, that state utility regulatory commissions and private
nonregulated utilities consider various proposed standards regulating rates and delivery of
service. Id. at 746-48. PURPA required the state commissions and nonregulated utilities to hold
public hearings to consider the proposed federal standards, to provide a written explanation of
any failure to adopt one or more of the proposed federal standards, and to submit certain
information to the Secretary of Energy at prescribed intervals. Id. at 748-49. PURPA, however,
did not require adoption of any of the specific standards considered. Id. at 749-50. In addition,
PURPA provided that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) should develop rules
to encourage the development of certain production facilities using alternative sources of energy
and that state commissions and nonregulated utilities should implement the regulations in some
prescribed manner. Id. at 750-51. Congress, furthermore, gave the FERC power to pre-empt
existing state and federal law governing alternative-source production facilities. Id. at 751. The
state of Mississippi and the Mississippi Public Service Commission filed suit against the Secretary
of Energy and the FERC, alleging that the provisions of PURPA affecting utility regulation
exceeded Congress' power under the commerce clause and violated the tenth amendment. Id.
at 752. The FERC Court found that federal regulation of electric and gas utilities was a proper
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under the tenth amendment. 124 Justice O'Connor, however, rejected the
majority's evaluation of the intrusiveness of the challenged provisions requiring state consideration of proposed federal standards.'2 In O'Connor's
view, federal legislation mandating that state agencies consider federal standards tends to displace local agendas and interferes with the states' responsibility to address local needs. 26 In FERC, in addition to the general principle

of federalism' 27 and the intent of the authors of the Constitution to reject
congressional control over state legislatures,'2 O'Connor relied explicitly on

the tenth amendment' 29 to support her view that federal intrusion into the
3 0
operation of state administrative agencies was impermissible.1
exercise of the commerce power. Id. at 758. The Court, however, proceeded to consider the
impact of PURPA on state independence. Id. at 758-71. Justice Blackmun, writing for the
Court, did not find that any contested provision unduly threatened state sovereignty. Id. at
769-70.
124. Id. at 753-71. Commentators have viewed FERC as limiting the applicability of
National League of Cities. See Rotunda, Usery in the Wake of Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission v. Mississippi, 1 CONST. COMMENTARY 43, 54-55 (1984) (Court's approval in FERC
of power of Congress to condition continued state regulation of pre-emptible area on state
consideration of federal proposals limits National League of Cities); Note, supra note 120, at
612 n.57 (FERC is inconsistent with spirit of National League of Cities); Note, The Supreme
Court, 1981 Term-FederalRegulation of State Institutions,96 HARv. L. REv. 186, 186-87 (1982)
(FERC limits extent to which National League of Cities protects state sovereignty) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Supreme Court, 1981 Term].
125. FERC, 456 U.S. at 775 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In
FERC, the state of Mississippi challenged not only the provision in PURPA requiring a state
agency to consider federal standards in publicly held hearings but also the requirement that
state agencies implement federal regulations issued by the FERC concerning alternative-source
energy production facilities. Id. at 752; see supra note 123 (discussing basis of Mississippi's
challenge to provisions of PURPA). The FERC Court approved the PURPA provisions requiring
the Mississippi Public Service Commission to implement the FERC regulations concerning
alternative-source energy producers by construing the requirement as merely affording complainants a state forum in which to assert federal rights. 456 U.S. at 759-61. O'Connor concurred
in the Court's decision to uphold the provision requiring implementation of the federal regulations
on the basis that states must provide a nondiscriminatory forum for state and federal rights.
Id. at 775 n.l. One constitutional scholar, however, has claimed that the degree to which
Congress can utilize state agencies to implement federal statutes remained an open question
after FERC. See NowAK, supra note 18, at 180-81 (finding difficulty in assessing how Court
would respond to federal statute requiring state to afford more than judicial forum for assertion
of federal right).
126. FERC, 456 U.S. at 779, 781, 787. In FERC, O'Connor asserted that pre-emption in
the field of utility regulation would be less intrusive than mandating that state utility commissions
must consider federal proposals. Id. at 786-87. According to O'Connor, requiring state agencies
to consider proposed federal standards involves considerable time, effort, and resources on the
part of state agencies that more properly should be directed toward local needs. Id.
127. Id. at 787-91.
128. Id. at 791-96.
129. Id. at 778.
130. See id. at 796-97 (Court should invalidate provisions of PURPA requiring state
regulatory agencies to consider federal standards). One commentator has suggested that federal
legislation requiring state agencies not only to consider but to enforce federal standards gives
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In Garcia, the issue dividing the Court was whether the tenth amendment

permitted the judiciary to limit Congress' exercise of the commerce power
to protect state interests as the Supreme Court had done in National League

of Cities.' In a 5-4 decision, the Garcia Court overruled National League
of Cities a2 and rejected the notion that the Constitution places any substanrise to a claim that Congress improperly has delegated its lawmaking powers to the states. See
Note, Supreme Court, 1981 Term, supra note 124, at 190-91 (Congress properly may not rely
on state implementation of federal standards that Congress was unable to enact as national
legislation).
131. 105 S. Ct. 1005, 1010 (1985). In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth.,
the controversy that precipitated the Supreme Court's reconsideration of National League of
Cities centered on whether the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) covered the employees of the
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (SAMTA). Id. at 1007. Although Congress had
amended the FLSA to include nearly all municipal and state employees, in NationalLeague of
Cities v. Usery the Court held that application of the FLSA to states and municipalities in a
way that interfered with traditional functions of state and local government was unconstitutional.
National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852. In 1979, the Department of Labor determined that
the operation of SAMTA was not protected from federal regulation as a traditional governmental
function under National League of Cities, and the Department, therefore, ordered SAMTA to
pay overtime premiums to its employees. See 105 S. Ct. at 1009. SAMTA filed suit against the
Secretary of Labor in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, seeking
a declaratory judgment that the application of FLSA overtime provisions to SAMTA was
unconstitutional under National League of Cities. See id. SAMTA did not challenge the
minimum wage provisions because SAMTA traditionally had paid its employees wages in excess
of the federal minimum wage. Id. at 1009 n.3. On the same day that SAMTA filed suit, Garcia
and several other employees of SAMTA filed suit against SAMTA, claiming overtime pay under
the FLSA. See id. at 1009. The district court stayed the employees' lawsuit, but permitted
Garcia to intervene as a defendant in SAMTA's suit against the Secretary of Labor. See id.
The district court subsequently held that the operation of a local public mass transit system was
a traditional governmental function under NationalLeague of Cities. See id. The Secretary and
Garcia appealed directly to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1252. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. §
1252 (1982) (providing for direct appeals from decisions invalidating acts of Congress). The
Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded the case to the district
court for reconsideration in light of United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R. Co. 105 S. Ct.
at 1009; see United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678, 690 (1982) (upholding
federal regulation of state-operated railroad based on history of federal regulation of state
railways). On remand, the district court again rejected the FLSA's applicability to SAMTA.
See 105 S. Ct. at 1009 (noting disposition of case in district court). The district court found
considerable state involvement in the operation of SAMTA, no persistent pattern of federal
regulation, and a similarity to governmental functions deemed immune from federal regulation
under National League of Cities. See id. at 1009-10 (noting district court decision). Again, the
Secretary and Garcia appealed directly to the Supreme Court. Id. at 1010. On reargument the
Court requested the parties to brief and argue whether the Court should reconsider its holding
in National League of Cities. Id.; see supra note 118 (discussing National League of Cities).
132. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1021. The Garcia majority rejected the criteria established in
National League of Cities to determine whether state activities were immune from federal
regulation under the commerce clause. Id. at 1015-16. The Court focused on the difficulty that
federal courts had experienced in classifying state activities as traditional or nontraditional
governmental functions, a distinction drawn in National League of Cities to protect certain
state activities from federal regulation. Id. at 1011-12; see Comment, supra note 119, at 638-44
& nn.86-118 (documenting inconsistent results reached by federal courts in applying traditional
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The Garcia

Court found no textual basis in the Constitution to support an independent,
judicially enforceable theory of state sovereignty.

34

Rather, the GarciaCourt

held that the Constitution protects state interests through provisions requiring
state representation within the federal government. 35 In the majority's view,
the states' power to challenge federal regulation of state activity under the

commerce clause lies in the political process, not in the courts.

36

Justice O'Connor dissented from the Garcia Court's view of the duty of

the judiciary in safeguarding state interests.

37

O'Connor claimed that, not-

withstanding the opinion of the Court, state autonomy continues to be an
essential consideration of the federal system. 3 8 O'Connor stressed that states
39
have legitimate interests that the federal judiciary has a duty to protect.'

governmental function test of National League of Cities). The Garcia Court, therefore, rejected
any limitation of the commerce power based on a judicial determination that the state activity
represents the exercise of traditional or integral state governmental functions. 105 S. Ct. at
1016.
133. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1017-18.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1018-20.
136. Id. at 1020; see id. at 1023, 1026-27, 1030 (Powell, J., dissenting) (dissenting from
majority's holding that Congress' exercise of commerce power is no longer reviewable).
137. Id. at 1033 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 1034, 1037-38. Although a strong advocate of state independence, O'Connor in
Garcia did not deny the need for congressional authority to deal with the problems of a
complex, industrialized nation. See id. at 1034 (authors of Constitution intended federal
government to have authority to deal with national problems); see also McElroy v. United
States, 455 U.S. 642, 648-56 (1982) (O'Connor, J.) (O'Connor broadly construed provision of
National Stolen Property Act, enacted under Congress' commerce power, to sustain conviction
of defendant without requiring proof that crime occurred before defendant crossed state lines).
139. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1034, 1037, 1038. In Garcia, Justice O'Connor viewed the
majority's treatment of the states as equivalent to private parties to be a departure from
precedent and inconsistent with the Constitution. Id. at 1037-38. The majority had determined
that Congress had acted within its powers in applying the FLSA equally to both the public and
private sectors. Id. at 1020 (Blackmun, J.). O'Connor, however, has been a strong voice
supporting the special rights of state sovereigns. See Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ.
& School Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 293-94 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that statute
of limitations in Quiet Title Act did not bar untimely lawsuit initiated by state to protect
property held in public trust). In Block, the federal government and North Dakota disputed
ownership rights to the riverbed of the Little Missouri River. Id. at 277. Under the Quiet Title
Act of 1972 (QTA), the federal government consented to be sued to determine title to real
property in which the federal government claimed an interest. Id. at 275-76; see 28 U.S.C. §
2409a(a) (1982) (providing that person may name United States as defendant in quiet title action
except as noted). The Block Court considered whether the twelve year statute of limitations in
the QTA barred North Dakota's action. 461 U.S. at 277; see 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(f) (providing
for twelve year statute of limitations). The Court noted that § 2409a(f) was silent concerning
the effect of the statute of limitations on states. 461 U.S. at 288; see 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(f)
(making no reference to actions initiated by states). Justice White, writing for the Court, held
that the twelve year statute of limitations applied to state actions. 461 U.S. at 290. Justice
O'Connor joined the Court's decision in Block that the QTA was North Dakota's exclusive

1985]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR

1209

Unlike her opinion in FERC,'40 however, O'Connor's opinion in Garcia did
not rely directly on the tenth amendment to limit Congress' power under the

commerce clause. 14 Rather O'Connor noted that the modern expansion of42
the commerce power had occurred under the necessary and proper clause.

O'Connor recognized McCulloch v. Maryland 43 as the source of Congress'
increasingly broad commerce power. O'Connor, however, relied in part on
the McCulloch Court's construction of the necessary and proper clause to

provide a constitutional basis to limit congressional authority under the
commerce clause. 44 In McCulloch, the state of Maryland had argued that
the necessary and proper clause restricted Congress' choice of legislative
means to those means indispensable to the exercise of a particular enumerated

power. 45 The McCulloch Court, however, construed the term "necessary"
more permissively. In order to afford Congress greater latitude to respond
to changing national needs, the Court interpreted "necessary"

to include

any means calculated to permit Congress to exercise its constitutional powers.' 46 The McCulloch Court held that the sole consideration in reviewing

the constitutionality of federal legislation is whether Congress had a legitimate purpose in enacting the legislation and whether the means selected by
Congress are consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution.

47

remedy. Id. at 293 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She refused, however, to apply the QTA's statute
of limitations to North Dakota. Id. at 294. Justice O'Connor invoked the common law doctrine
that time does not bar a sovereign. Id. at 294-97. In O'Connor's view, Congress did not intend
to limit, through legislative silence, a state's power to protect rights in property held in trust
for the public. Id. at 299.
140. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (observing O'Connor's reliance on tenth
amendment to limit Congress' authority under commerce clause).
141. See Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1035-37 (O'Connor arguing that necessary and proper clause
requires that Congress not contravene values recognized in tenth amendment).
142. Id. at 1035-36.
143. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). In McCulloch v. Maryland, the directors of a national
bank, incorporated by Congress, established a branch bank in Baltimore, Maryland, without
permission from the state of Maryland. Id. at 317-18. The state of Maryland sued the cashier
of the branch bank for failing to comply with a Maryland law that imposed a tax on all banks
not chartered by the Maryland legislature. Id. at 319-22. Chief Justice Marshall, in writing for
the Court, found that incorporation of a national bank was an appropriate means by which
Congress could exercise its delegated powers and that Maryland's tax law as applied to the
Bank of the United States was unconstitutional. Id. at 424-25, 436.
144. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1036.
145. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 412-13; see L. TRIBE, supra note 24, § 5-3, at 228
n.5. Professor Tribe has noted that Marshall, in McCulloch, did not regard the necessary and
proper clause as essential to uphold Congress' exercise of an implied power, but reached a
construction of that clause only after the state of Maryland argued that the necessary and
proper clause restricted Congress' power under the commerce clause. L. TRIBE, supra note 24,
§ 5-3, at 228 n.5.
146. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 413-15, 418-21.
147. Id. at 421. Commentators have construed McCulloch's test of constitutionality as a
standard of review that requires only a rational relationship between the challenged legislation
and the enumerated power that Congress seeks to exercise. See NowAK, supra note 18, at 127-
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According to O'Connor, no federal legislation that contravenes the spirit of
the Constitution can withstand constitutional attack, 148 despite the broad
authority that the necessary and proper clause affords Congress. Because the
tenth amendment, in O'Connor's view, recognizes the integrity of the states,
federal regulation under the necessary and proper clause that threatens state
sovereignty can be challenged as violating the spirit of the tenth amend49

ment.1

As Justice O'Connor ardently argued in FERC and Garcia,the principle

of federalism cautions against unwarranted federal intrusion into the administration of state government. 50 O'Connor's support for the integrity of the
states has played a significant role in her response to questions concerning
the proper scope of federal review of state court judgments.'" For example,

writing for the Court in Michigan v. Long,152 O'Connor articulated a new
test based on respect for the dual system of state and federal courts to govern

the Supreme Court's review of state court judgments in cases in which
plaintiffs have raised federal constitutional claims. 53 In the proper exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction over state courts, the Supreme Court has refused
to review state court judgments that rest on independent and adequate state
grounds.

54

In Long, O'Connor recounted the various approaches the Court

had taken to determine whether a state court judgment rested on state or
federal law.

5

The Long Court held that the Supreme Court would not

29 (McCulloch established deferential test to permit congressional exercise of delegated powers);
cf. L. TRIBE, supra note 24, § 5-3, at 230 & n.12 (describing McCulloch test as establishing
minimum standard of review).
148. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1036.
149. Id.
150. See supra notes 121-49 and accompanying text (discussing O'Connor's dissent in
FERC and Garcia).
151. See McKaskle v. Vela, 104 S. Ct. 736, 737-38 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (Court should grant certiorari to clarify that exhaustion rule requires
dismissal of habeas petition containing specific factual allegations not raised in state court in
support of federal constitutional claim); Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3476 (1983)
(O'Connor, J.) (Supreme Court will not review state court judgment if state court furnishes
plain statement that its judgment rests on independent and adequate state ground); Engle v.
Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982) (O'Connor, J.) (procedural default in state court precluded
state prisoner from asserting federal constitutional claim in habeas proceeding when prisoner
failed in federal court to establish cause of his default); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518-19,
522 (1982) (O'Connor, J.) (comity requires federal district court to dismiss habeas petition when
petition contains claim not exhausted in state courts).
152. 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983) (O'Connor, J.).
153. Id. at 3474-76.
154. See 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER & E. GRFssp., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4019, at 661-62 (1977) (Supreme Court will refuse to exercise its jurisdiction if
state court judgment rests on substantive state law regardless of how state court decides federal
claim, or if state relied on adequate procedural law to bar plaintiff's federal claim) [hereinafter
cited as C. WmRIH, FEDERAL PRACTICE].
155. Long, 103 S. Ct. at 3474-75. In Michigan v. Long, O'Connor noted that the Supreme
Court, faced with the task of determining whether a state court judgment rested on state or
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review a state court judgment, despite the presence of federal constitutional
claims, if the state court asserted in a plain statement that its decision rested
on an independent and adequate state ground.1-S6 Under the plain statement
rule, a federal court could exercise jurisdiction to review the state court's
decision only if the state court did not indicate clearly that the state court's
decision rested on state law. 15 7 O'Connor's rule in Long, therefore, provides
the state court with an ability to defeat federal jurisdiction. 58
O'Connor's earlier advocacy of the state courts' capacity to litigate
federal constitutional issues' 59 has found expression since her confirmation
in two opinions in which she has restricted the right of state prisoners to
bring federal constitutional claims in federal habeas proceedings when the
prisoner had failed to raise the constitutional claims during the course of
criminal proceedings in the state courts. '6 In Rose v. Lundy,' 6' O'Connor,
writing for the majority, held that a federal district court, out of respect for
a state court, must dismiss a petition for a writ of habeas corpus that
federal law, alternatively would dismiss the case, vacate the judgment, continue the case pending
clarification by the state court of the grounds on which it relied, or attempt to construe state
law on its own. Id. O'Connor found this case-by-case evaluation unsatisfactory. Id. at 3475.
156. Id. at 3476.
157. Id.
158. See Schlueter, JudicialFederalism and Supreme Court Review of State Court Decisions: A Sensible Balance Emerges, 59 NoTRE DANm L. REv. 1079, 1095 (1984) (state court
reliance on independent and adequate state ground after Long will preclude federal judicial
review).
159. See supra notes 3-12 and accompanying text (discussing O'Connor's judicial philosophy before confirmation as Associate Justice).
160. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982) (O'Connor, J.) (failure of state prisoner
to demonstrate cause for procedural default that barred federal constitutional claim in state
court resulted in dismissal of claim in habeas proceeding); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522
(1982) (O'Connor, J.) (district court must dismiss habeas petition of state prisoner when petition
includes unexhausted federal constitutional claim); see also Justice of Boston Mun. Court v.
Lyon, 104 S. Ct. 1805, 1828-30 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (concurring in dismissal of
habeas petition on grounds that court did not have jurisdiction under federal habeas statute to
hear complaint of state defendant not in physical custody following state conviction). Commentators have criticized the procedural hurdles created in Lundy and Isaac as restricting access for
state prisoners to a federal forum. See, e.g., Reinhardt, Limiting Access to the FederalCourts:
Round Up the Usual Victims, 6 WHn-TIER L. REv. 967, 973-75 (1984) (criticizing procedural
hurdles for federal habeas review because personal liberty is involved); Wright, HabeasCorpus:
Its History and its Future, 81 MICH. L. REv. 802, 807-10 (1983) (questioning trend toward
creating procedural hurdles through judicial rather than legislative decision making); Note, The
Supreme Court, 1981 Term-HabeasCorpus, 96 HAxv. L. Rav. 217, 222-26 (1982) (questioning
Court's focus on performance of trial counsel in failing to raise properly federal claims in state
court as basis for restricting plaintiff's access to federal court). See generally Comment, Lundy,
Isaac and Frady: A Trilogy of Habeas Corpus Restraint, 32 CAmH. U.L. REv. 169 (1982)
(judicially created procedural hurdles in Lundy and Isaac restrict access to federal forum for
state prisoners).
161. 455 U.S. 509 (1982). In Rose v. Lundy, the Court considered whether the exhaustion
rule required dismissal of a habeas corpus petition containing federal claims that had not been
exhausted in state courts. Id. at 510; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c) (1982) (applicant for writ of
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contained a federal constitutional claim not exhausted in the state court.

62

O'Connor argued that the total exhaustion rule adopted in Lundy is not a

jurisdictional prerequisite for the exercise of federal habeas corpus review,
habeas corpus must exhaust state remedies unless applicant can show absence of effective state
process). A jury had convicted Lundy of rape and crimes against nature. 455 U.S. at 510.
Lundy appealed his conviction without success through the Tennessee state court system. Id.
Lundy then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court, alleging four grounds
for relief, two of which he had not raised in the state appeals. See id. at 511. Although the
district court held that it could not review the unexhausted claims, the district court did consider
the unexhausted claims in reviewing the atmosphere of the entire state proceeding. See id. at
511-13. The district court independently reviewed the state trial transcript and considered events
that occurred at trial to which the defendant had not objected at trial, in his state appeal, or
in his habeas petition. See id. at 511-13, 513 n.3. The district court concluded that the trial was
not fair and had violated the defendant's sixth amendment rights. See id. at 512-13. The court
ordered the release of the defendant pending timely retrial by the state. See id. at 513 n.4. The
Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court order, rejecting the state's argument that the district
court should have dismissed the petition because it contained unexhausted claims. See id. at
513.
162. Lundy, 455 U.S. at 522. O'Connor began her analysis in Rose v. Lundy by stressing
that the rule requiring a petitioner seeking habeas corpus relief to exhaust all federal claims in
state courts was a matter of comity. Id. at 515-16. Professor Tribe has described comity as the
foundation of the federal-state court system. L. TiB, supra note 24, § 3-29, at 147-48.
Although Congress codified the exhaustion rule in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c) by requiring a
petitioner to present only exhausted claims in a federal habeas petition, O'Connor found that
§ 2254(b)-(c) gave no guidance to the federal courts when a petition contained both exhausted
and unexhausted claims. 455 U.S. at 516; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c) (1982) (providing that court will
not grant writ unless petitioner in custody has exhausted state remedies or has shown no
effective state process available and providing that petitioner will not have exhausted state
remedies if petitioner has right to raise "question presented" in state court). O'Connor,
therefore, looked to the policies behind § 2254 to determine the scope of the statute. 455 U.S.
at 517. Relying on case law rather than congressional records, O'Connor stated that the function
of the exhaustion rule was primarily to protect the state court's role in enforcing federal law
and to check interference in state court proceedings. Id. at 518. According to O'Connor, comity
required that federal courts provide state courts with the first opportunity to rule on federal
claims, which in turn would increase the state courts' ease in dealing with federal questions and
would result in a more highly developed factual record if the petitioner sought review in federal
court. Id. at 518-19. Furthermore, in O'Connor's view, strict application of the exhaustion rule
to mixed petitions would encourage more effective federal judicial review because petitioners
would present a single petition to the reviewing federal court. Id. at 520. But see Yackle, The
Exhaustion Doctrine in FederalHabeas Corpus: An Argument for a Return to FirstPrinciples,
44 Omo ST. L.J. 393, 424-27, 429-31 (1983) (any goal to create better factual record for federal
review or to avoid piecemeal litigation serves federal interest in efficiency rather than comity).
O'Connor concluded that because, in her view, the total exhaustion rule strengthened the basis
of comity and did not burden unreasonably the state prisoner, the district court must dismiss
mixed petitions. 455 U.S. at 522.
Only three justices, however, joined O'Connor's consideration in Lundy of the impact of
rule 9(b) governing dismissal of successive petitions on the petitioner's initial decision to delete
unexhausted claims, to present exhausted claims, and then, if necessary, to refile a second
petition containing the previously unexhausted claims at a later date. Id. at 520-21; see 28
U.S.C. § 2254, Rule 9(b) (1982) (federal judge may dismiss successive petition as abuse of writ
if petitioner delays presenting additional grounds for relief). O'Connor raised the possibility
that if a petitioner failed to present all grounds for habeas relief in one petition, rule 9(b) may
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a principle of federalism which assumes that no

constitutional basis exists for preferring a federal over state forum for
litigating federal constitutional claims.

64

Similarly, in Engle v. Isaac,1 6 1

O'Connor, again writing for the majority, held that in a habeas proceeding
a state prisoner could not raise a federal constitutional claim barred in state
court by procedural default unless the prisoner could show cause for and
permit dismissal of all subsequent petitions. 455 U.S. at 521.
Professor Yackle has criticized O'Connor's decision in Lundy as changing the exhaustion
rule from a discretionary rule of timing, encouraging district court judges to refrain from
federal review before prisoners presented their federal claims to state court, to a preclusive
prerequisite for habeas review. See Yackle, supra, at 438. Yackle, however, concedes that total
exhaustion may be appropriate when the exhausted and unexhausted claims are very closely
related. Id. at 445. A second commentator has pointed out that the general rule requiring
dismissal of all mixed petitions adopted in Lundy was stricter than any exhaustion rule being
followed by any of the circuits. 17 C. XVxRurr, FEDERAL PRAcnicE, supra note 154, § 4264, at
176 (Supp. 1983).
163. See Lundy, 455 U.S. at 515-16, 518-20 (exhaustion rule codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254
rests on comity); see also McKaskle v. Vela, 104 S. Ct. 736, 737 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (exhaustion rule serves comity and reduces federal-state friction).
164. See L. TRiBE, supra note 24, § 3-39, at 147-48 (because both federal and state courts
must uphold the Constitution, comity urges that no constitutional basis exists to prefer federal
court over state court as protector of federal constitutional rights unless state judicial process
is inadequate).
165. 456 U.S. 107 (1982). In Engle v. Isaac, the Supreme Court consolidated the review of
three individual petitions for writs of habeas corpus on grounds that Ohio had tried and
convicted each petitioner after the effective date of Ohio's new criminal code, but before the
Ohio Supreme Court construed certain relevant code provisions allocating the burden of
production to the defendant to raise affirmative defenses. Id. at 111-12; see OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 2901.05(A) (1975) (amended 1978) (providing that burden of going forward is on the
accused). Defendants Hughes, Bell, and Isaac pled self-defense as an affirmative defense to
charges in their respective Ohio criminal proceedings. 456 U.S. at 112, 113, 114. In each case,
the trial judge had instructed the jury that the defendant had the burden of proof to establish
self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. Neither Hughes, Bell, nor Isaac had
objected at trial to the jury instruction on burden of proof. See id. Hughes and Bell both
appealed their subsequent convictions, but never raised any objection to the self-defense jury
instruction. See id. at 113, 114. Following Issac's conviction, however, the Ohio Supreme Court
construed § 2901.05(A) to provide that, although the defendant has the burden to come forward
with some evidence of self-defense, the prosecution has the burden of persuasion to show that
the defendant did not act in self-defense. See id. at 111, 115. Isaac, therefore, did raise an
objection to the self-defense jury instructions in his state appeal based on the state supreme
court ruling. See id. at 115. The state appeals court, however, held that Isaac had waived his
claim because he had not made a contemporaneous objection to the jury instruction at trial.
See id. The Ohio Supreme Court dismissed Isaac's claim for failure to present a substantial
constitutional question. See id. at 116.
Each of the three defendants petitioned in federal district court without success for a
writ of habeas corpus. See id. In the cases of Hughes and Isaac, the district court found, in
part, that the defendants had not satisfied the requirements of Wainwright v. Sykes that
permitted a state prisoner to raise in federal court a federal constitutional claim barred by
procedural default in state court only if the petitioner could explain the cause of his procedural
default and could demonstrate resulting prejudice. See id. at 116, 118; see Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977) (waiver of federal constitutional claim at trial bars habeas review unless
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actual prejudice resulting from his default.'6 The ease with which state
prisoners may seek habeas review, in O'Connor's view, undercuts the finality
of state court judgments, reduces the significance of a trial and often results
in the defendant's freedom from prosecution.' 67 Furthermore, according to
O'Connor, easily invoked habeas review may interfere with the state's
sovereign power both to prosecute defendants and to uphold federal constitutional rights.'6 Although the Supreme Court has not exercised its jurisdicstate prisoner can show cause for and prejudice resulting from waiver). In Bell's case, although
the district court cited Wainwright, among other cases, in its decision to deny Bell's petition,
the district court made no inquiry whether Bell had satisfied the cause and prejudice standard
of Wainwright. See 456 U.S. at 117. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, however,
reversed the lower federal court orders. See id. at 118. In Isaac's case, the court of appeals
ruled that Isaac had satisfied the cause and prejudice requirements of Wainwright, and a
majority of the en banc court found that the jury instructions had violated the defendant's due
process rights under the fourteenth amendment. See id. (Court noting Sixth Circuit disposition
of case). The Sixth Circuit subsequently ordered Bell and Hughes released from custody, subject
to timely efforts by the state to retry them. See id. at 119 (Court noting action taken by Sixth
Circuit). The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decisions of the
Sixth Circuit. Id.
166. Engle, 456 U.S. at 135. Acknowledging the presence of a federal constitutional claim,
the Engle Court considered whether the defendants had preserved their claim and, if not,
whether the provisions in Wainwright barred their claim in a habeas proceeding. Id. at 121-23.
O'Connor, writing for the majority, first established that the defendants had forfeited their
federal constitutional claim in state court under state law by failing to make a contemporaneous
objection to jury instructions at trial. Id. at 124-25. In O'Connor's view, therefore, the issue
became whether the defendants could litigate that federal claim despite their procedural default
in state court. Id. at 125. O'Connor reaffirmed the standard established in Wainwright that a
state prisoner seeking habeas corpus relief after procedural default in state court must demonstrate cause and actual prejudice to avoid dismissal of his petition in federal court. Id. at 129.
To show cause for their default at trial, the defendants claimed that they were unaware that
allocating the burden of proof to the defendant to establish self-defense implicated the due
process clause and that, in any event, any objection to the state's practice of placing the burden
on the accused would have been futile. Id. at 130. O'Connor rejected both arguments, claiming
that the due process implications of placing the self-defense burden on the defendant were not
unknown at the time of the defendants' trials. Id. at 131-33 & 133 n.41. Furthermore, O'Connor
stated that a defendant may not foreclose as futile the possibility of raising a federal constitutional claim in state court simply because other parties had appealed the issue unsuccessfully in
the past. Id. at 130. Quickly dismissing the defendant's final argument attacking the cause and
prejudice standard, O'Connor on behalf of the majority held that, based on a need for finality
in state court judgments and considerations of comity, the Court would not disturb the cause
and prejudice standard. Id. at 134-35.
In United States v. Frady, O'Connor, writing for the majority, also required federal
prisoners attacking federal convictions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to demonstrate cause and
prejudice resulting from procedural default in federal proceedings. See United States v. Frady,
456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982) (O'Connor, J.) (following unsuccessful direct appeal, federal
prisoner may challenge his conviction based on trial error to which he made no contemporaneous
objection only by demonstrating cause for default and actual prejudice resulting from error);
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1982) (providing that federal prisoner may move in court that sentenced him
to vacate his sentence at any time on any grounds that sentence is unlawful).
167. Engle, 456 U.S. at 126-28.
168. Id. at 128 & n.33.
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tion to review directly a state court judgment involving federal questions
when the state court relied on adequate procedural grounds in refusing to
address the federal claim, 169 the Supreme Court had not in the past required
federal district courts to accord the same deference to state procedural law

in the exercise of habeas corpus review.170 O'Connor's opinions in Lundy
and Isaac, however, exemplify the current Court's recognition of adequate
state procedures as a bar to federal claims in habeas proceedings 7' and the

parity with the
Court's apparent attempt to bring federal habeas review into
72
Supreme Court's direct review of state court judgments.'
Another significant example of Justice O'Connor's exercise of judicial
restraint based on her respect for federalism is her decided deference to state
legislative judgment when litigants challenge the constitutionality of state
statutes.'17 O'Connor has dissented vigorously when the Court has struck
169. 16 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 154, § 4019, at 661-62.
170. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 426-35 (1963) (rejecting application of independent
and adequate state ground rule to federal habeas review of prisoner complaints of unconstitutional detention).
171. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-91 (1977) (rejecting Fay as failing to accord
in federal habeas review sufficient deference to state's refusal to hear federal constitutional
claim waived in state court); see also Remington, State Prisoner Access to Postconviction
Relief-A Lessening Role ForFederalCourts; An IncreasinglyImportant Role for State Courts,
44 OHIO ST. L.J. 287, 299 (1983) (Lundy and Isaac rest on assumption that adequate state
procedures protect constitutional rights of state criminal defendants).
172. See 16 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTiCE, supra note 154, § 4020, at 297-98 (Supp.
1983) (noting that Wainwright brought habeas review more closely in line with direct review by
requiring increased deference in habeas proceeding to adequate state procedural bar to federal
claim).
173. See, e.g., Brown v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders Int'l Union
Local 54, 104 S. Ct. 3179, 3190 (1984) (O'Connor, J.) (finding no pre-emption because state
law providing for disqualification of certain labor union officials from serving as elected
representatives actually did not conflict with federal law guaranteeing union members right to
elect whomever they wish); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321, 2324, 2330-32
(1984) (O'Connor, J.) (upholding against challenge under public use clause state law providing
for involuntary transfer of title with compensation from lessor to lessee); Minnesota State Bd.
for Community Colleges v. Knight, 104 S. Ct. 1058, 1068-70 (1984) (O'Connor, J.) (upholding
state law restricting participation of nonunion public employees in selection of exclusive
representatives to advisory committees as not violative of first amendment or equal protection
clause); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 104 S. Ct. 852, 855, 864-65 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (finding that Federal Arbitration Act is federal procedural law unenforceable in state
court under supremacy clause); Rice v. Rehner, 103 S. Ct. 3291, 3293, 3298, 3302-03 (1983)
(O'Connor, J.) (finding no pre-emption of state law requiring federally licensed Indian trader
to have state liquor license when Indians had enjoyed no prior immunity from state liquor
regulation and when Congress intended state law to apply to liquor traffic); Mennonite Bd. of
Missions v. Adams, 103 S. Ct. 2706, 2712-17 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (finding Court
improperly upheld mortgagees' interest against state interest by requiring state to notify
mortgagees by particular means concerning pending tax sale of mortgaged property despite
mortgagees' superior position to protect their own property interest); Brown v. Thomson, 103
S. Ct. 2690, 2699-700 (1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (joining majority in upholding popular
representation plan in Wyoming despite overall 89% maximum deviation from one man-one
vote standard because issue before Court was whether representation in one particular county
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down state legislation challenged under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.1 74 Similarly, O'Connor has urged more careful consideration of state interests when the Court has invalidated state statutes under
created any additional deviation from statewide overall deviation); City of Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2512, 2515, 2516 (1983) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing majority's invalidating as violative of due process clause city ordinances
regulating abortions, in part, because, in O'Connor's view, several challenged ordinances did
not burden unduly women's decision to have abortion); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,
774-75 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (upholding state interest in banning distribution of
child pornography against first amendment challenge); ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax
Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 331-32 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's decision
to strike down under due process clause state efforts to apportion and tax intangible investment
income of interstate corporations); Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 459-60 (1982) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting) (Court should not invalidate under due process clause state law providing for
posted notice of eviction from public housing project on basis of inadequate record); cf. Lynch
v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1366-67 (1984) (concurring in decision upholding city's display of
Christmas creche as not violating first amendment, but writing separately to clarify three-part
Lemon test used by majority by focusing establishment clause analysis on governmental
entanglement with religious institutions and government endorsement or disapproval of religion);
Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 921 (1982)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (Court should not hold decision of local elected school board to
remove certain books from school library as violative of first amendment so long as board does
not interfere with student rights to read and discuss books). But see Kolender v. Lawson, 461
U.S. 352, 361-62 (1983) (O'Connor, J.) (finding state statute unconstitutional under due process
clause for failure of legislature to define with particularity what action taken by suspect would
satisfy California stop-and-identify statute); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota
Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 592-93 (1983) (O'Connor, J.) (holding invalid under first
amendment state law imposing differential tax on press); Mississippi Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 733 (1982) (O'Connor, J.) (holding invalid under equal protection clause
state law limiting admissions to state supported nursing school to women only); Fidelity Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 171-72 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(joining majority to uphold federal pre-emption of certain state laws governing federal savings
and loan associations, but writing separately to note limits on federal agency power to pre-empt
state law); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for the County of Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596,
611 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (joining Court to invalidate under first amendment state
law that required judge to close criminal trial during testimony of minor who was victim of sex
offense based on long tradition of open criminal trials and on state's failure to justify mandatory
exclusion of public); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 71-74 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(would strike down Alaska's plan to distribute funds from oil resources to residents based on
length of residency under privileges and immunities clause rather than equal protection clause
on which majority relied); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 102-06 (1982) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (concurring in majority's decision to strike Texas' one-year statute of limitations
for paternity suits as violative of equal protection clause, but wrote separately to stress that
longer statutory period likewise may be unconstitutional).
174. See Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 103 S. Ct. 2706, 2712-17 (1983) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting) (finding Court improperly upheld mortgagees' interest against state interest by
requiring state to notify mortgagees by particular means concerning pending tax sale of
mortgaged property despite mortgagees' superior position to protect own property interest);
ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 331-32 (1982) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing majority's decision to strike down under due process clause state efforts
to apportion and tax intangible investment income of interstate corporations); Greene v. Lindsey,
456 U.S. 444, 459-60 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (Court should not invalidate under due
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the equal protection clause. 7 - O'Connor also has upheld a state's exercise
process clause state law providing for posted notice of eviction from public housing project on
basis of inadequate record). In ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, the Court considered
whether Idaho constitutionally could tax a portion of intangible investment income received by
a nonresident parent corporation doing business in Idaho. 458 U.S. at 308-09. The intangible
income at issue in ASARCO included dividends, interest payments, and capital gains from stock
sales. Id. at 309. Under state law, Idaho apportioned to itself a share of the investment income
earned by ASARCO from foreign subsidiaries. Id. at 309 n.2, 310 n.4, 310-14. The ASARCO
Court found that ASARCO had not exercised sufficient control over the foreign subsidiaries to
permit Idaho to apportion and tax ASARCO's investment income from those sources. Id. at
322-24, 327. The ASARCO Court invalidated the Idaho statute as violative of the due process
clause. Id. at 328-29, 330. Unwilling to join the majority, O'Connor found that ASARCO's
investments in the foreign subsidiary were an integral part of ASARCO's business, and that
income derived from those investments, therefore, was subject to state apportionment and
taxation. Id. at 339. Moreover, O'Connor noted that the Court's decision raised serious questions
whether any state constitutionally could tax the contested investment income after ASARCO.
Id. at 344. Additionally, in O'Connor's view, the Court's reliance on the due process clause to
invalidate state tax law hindered state efforts within Congress to create a uniform national
system of taxation for intangible investment income of interstate corporations. Id. at 331, 350
n. 14. O'Connor complained that the judiciary had pre-empted Congress in the complicated field
of taxation of multijurisdictional business, an area in which Congress is more qualified to act
than the judiciary. Id. at 350-53.
In Mennonite Bd. of Missionsv. Adams, the Court considered whether notice by publication
and posting as required by Indiana law was constitutionally adequate to inform a mortgagee
that the county intended to sell the mortgaged property for nonpayment of taxes. 103 S. Ct. at
2708-09. The Court held that notice by publication and posting violated the due process rights
of mortgagees. Id. at 2712. In the majority's view, the state must inform by mail or comparable
means any person whose name and address are reasonably discoverable of any proceeding that
adversely affects his property interests. Id. O'Connor criticized the Court's decision as an
unwarranted extension of Mullane v. CentralHanover Bank & Trust Co., which permitted the
trustee of a common fund to notify beneficiaries of proceedings affecting their property rights
by publication under certain circumstances. Id. at 2713; see Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
& Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317-18 (1950) (notice by publication is permissible when whereabouts
or identity of persons is unknown or when person's interests are speculative or remote).
O'Connor observed that the effort required of a state to discover the identity and whereabouts
of parties entitled to notice of state proceedings was not clear from the Court's opinion. Id. at
2715. O'Connor found that state interests outweighed those of individual mortgagees, who are
able to protect their interests easily by checking the public record or by requiring the mortgagors
to provide proof of payments of property taxes or to deposit monies in escrow with the
mortgagee for tax payments. Id. at 2716-17.
In Greene v. Lindsey, the Court considered whether a Kentucky statute provided adequate
notice of eviction proceedings against tenants who lived in public housing projects. 456 U.S. at
445. Relying on the constitutional standard that notice must be reasonably calculated to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of an action, the Court found that notice by posting summons
on the tenant's door in a public housing project was constitutionally deficient. Id. at 449-50,
453; see Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 (due process requires notice reasonably calculated to alert
persons of pending action and to provide them opportunity to be heard). In a strongly worded
dissent, however, O'Connor found the testimony concerning the reliability of posted notice
conflicting and criticized the Court for overturning state law based on an inadequate record.
Id. at 459-60 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
175. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 71-73 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (Court
should not declare state interest illegitimate without careful analysis).
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of eminent domain challenged under the public use clause.176 Moreover,
O'Connor has resisted challenges under the supremacy clause to state laws

that conflict with existing federal statutes. 77 For example, in Southland
Corp. v. Keating,178 O'Connor dissented from the Court's recognition of the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 179 as a substantive federal right to which
conflicting state law must yield under the supremacy clause. In Southland,

various California franchises of 7-Eleven convenience stores sued Southland
Corporation, the franchisor, in California state court, alleging that Southland
had violated various provisions of the California Franchise Investment
Law. 80 Southland's standard franchise agreement had contained an arbitration clause
Southland,
the claims
California

requiring arbitration of all disputes arising under the contract.',
therefore, moved to compel arbitration of all claims, including
arising under the California law protecting franchisees.1 2 The
Supreme Court refused to enforce the arbitration clause of the

franchise agreement and held that the California Franchise Investment Law
afforded the plaintiffs access to a judicial forum, notwithstanding the parties'
prior agreement to arbitrate commercial contract disputes.' 83 The Southland

Court reversed the decision of the California Supreme Court, finding that
the FAA created a substantive federal right to enforce arbitration agreements

in federal or state courts.8

4

In her Southland dissent, Justice O'Connor

176. See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321, 2324, 2330-32 (1984) (O'Connor,
J.) (upholding against challenges under public use clause state law providing for involuntary
transfer of title with compensation from lessor to lessee). See generally Note, Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff: A Final Requiem For the Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain?,
60 NoTrm DAmE L. REv. 388 (1985) (criticizing Midkiff as establishing minimum scrutiny of
state seizure of private property for private use).
177. See, e.g., Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees and Bartenders Int'l Union Local
54, 104 S. Ct. 3179, 3190 (1984) (O'Connor, J.) (finding no pre-emption because state law
providing for disqualification of certain labor union officials from serving as elected representatives actually did not conflict with federal law guaranteeing union members right to elect
whomever they wished to serve as officials); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 104 S. Ct. 852, 855,
864-65 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (Court should not invalidate conflicting state law under
supremacy clause to enforce federal procedural law in state court); Rice v. Rehner, 103 S. Ct.
3291, 3293, 3298, 3302-03 (1983) (O'Connor, J.) (finding no pre-emption of state law requiring
federally licensed Indian trader to have state liquor license because Indians. had enjoyed no
prior immunity from state liquor regulation and because Congress intended state law to apply
to liquor traffic); cf. Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 171-72
(1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (O'Connor concurred in Court's opinion that federal agency
regulations concerning practices of federal savings and loan associations may pre-empt conflicting state law under supremacy clause, but wrote separately to emphasize limits on pre-emption
power of federal agencies).
178. 104 S.Ct. 852 (1984).
179. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
180. Southland, 104 S. Ct. at 855.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 856.
184. Id. at 858, 861. See generally Note, A Controversial Settling of a Settlement Contro-
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argued that Supreme Court precedent limited the power of the federal
judiciary to require state courts to enforce federal law. 8 5 O'Connor contended that Congress did not intend to create a federal right enforceable in
state courts by enacting the FAA.8 6 Rather, in O'Connor's view, Congress
intended to create either general federal common law or a procedural right
to compel arbitration. 8 7 O'Connor noted that following the passage of the
FAA the Court, in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, had abolished general
federal common law. 88 O'Connor concluded, therefore, that any federal
right to compel arbitration under the FAA was strictly procedural in nature
and unenforceable in state courts.8 9 Justice O'Connor's dissent is not
antagonistic to the policies behind arbitration, but rather is an attempt to
limit the federal judiciary's power to invalidate state law under the supremacy
clause without a clear congressional intent to create substantive federal law. '°
versy: The Supreme Court Declared the FederalArbitrationAct Preemptive of State Laws and
Applicable in State Courts, 36 AlA. L. REv. 273 (1984) (discussing ambiguity of FAA's
applicability to state courts settled by Southland); Note, Resolving the Conflict Between
Arbitration Clauses and Claims Under Unfair and Deceptive PracticesActs, 64 B.U. L. Rv.
377 (1984) (discussing conflict between state and federal arbitration statutes and state legislation
designed to protect certain parties to commercial contracts by providing judicial forum despite
arbitration agreement).
185. Southland, 104 S. Ct. at 864-65, 871 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that absent constitutional provision or act of
Congress federal courts must apply state substantive law in diversity suit); see also Bernhardt v.
Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 202-05 (1956) (holding that right to compel
arbitration is substantive right governed by local law).
186. Southland, 104 S. Ct. at 864-67.
187. Id. at 864.
188. Id.; see Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (declaring that federal courts may not establish substantive
common law binding on state courts).
189. Southland, 104 S. Ct. at 865-68 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
190. See id. at 871 (arbitration is valuable alternative to litigation). Justice O'Connor
joined the Court's unanimous decision in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, which enforced
a private arbitration agreement under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). See Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 53 U.S.L.W. 4222, 4223-24 (1985) (Court enforced arbitration agreement
at expense of bifurcating proceeding to deal separately with arbitrable and unarbitrable claims
presented together in one lawsuit); Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982). In Byrd,
an investor sued Dean Witter Reynolds, a securities broker-dealer, under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 ('34 Act) and under state law for losses incurred in his securities account. 53
U.S.L.W. at 4222. The agreement between the plaintiff and the brokerage firm contained an
arbitration clause requiring arbitration of all claims arising out of the broker-client relationship.
Id. The defendant moved to compel arbitration of the state law claims under the FAA. Id. The
Court noted that the defendant had assumed that § 10(b) claims under the '34 Act were not
arbitrable and, therefore, the defendant did not move to compel arbitration of the federal
claims. Id. The Byrd Court then considered whether the presence of arbitrable and nonarbitrable
claims in one lawsuit required a denial of the motion to compel arbitration in order to resolve
all the claims in one proceeding in federal court or required a bifurcation of the proceeding in
federal court to permit arbitration of the arbitrable state claims. Id. at 4223. The Byrd Court
supported the policy of the FAA to enforce private arbitration agreements at the expense of
piecemeal litigation and held that the California district court had erred in denying the
defendant's motion to compel arbitration of the state claims. Id. at 4223-24, 4225.
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Another dimension of Justice O'Connor's restraint in granting equitable
relief also appears when the relief requested involves federal judicial intervention into state government. 191 Intrusion into state government immediately implicates federalism considerations. In considering the proper role of the federal
courts in Allen v. Wright, 92 O'Connor supported the heightened standing requirements that the Court demanded of the plaintiffs in O'Shea v. Littleton, 191

The differences between Southland Corp. v. Keating and Byrd sharpen the basis of
O'Connor's dissent in Southland. In Southland, the plaintiffs filed suit in California state court
under state law that, in effect, circumvented the plaintiff's arbitration agreement with Southland
by providing a judicial forum for resolution of the parties' claims. 104 S. Ct. at 856. In Byrd,
however, the plaintiff filed suit in a California federal district court, which exercised diversity
and pendent jurisdiction over the state law claims. 53 U.S.L.W. at 4222. O'Connor conceded
in Southland that any party in a diversity action in federal court could compel arbitration under
the FAA whereas O'Connor objected to requiring state courts to enforce the FAA as substantive
federal law binding on state courts. 104 S. Ct. at 865, 870, 871.
191. See supra notes 99-109 and accompanying text (discussion of O'Connor's tendency to
limit equitable discretion of federal courts under Title VII).
192. See Allen, 104 S. Ct. at 3330 (citing O'Shea, Rizzo, and Lyons as demonstrating
proper role of federal judiciary). In Allen v. Wright, O'Connor refused to open the courthouse
doors to plaintiffs who were unable to show direct and specific injury, but rather complained
only generally of improper governmental practices or sought to restructure an agency of the
federal government. Id. at 3329-30. By citing O'Shea, Rizzo, and Lyons as cases reflecting the
proper role of the federal courts, O'Connor has implied that the plaintiff seeking to enjoin
government action may not rely on a single discrete injury, but must show a continuing
predictable pattern of harm. Id. at 3330; see infra notes 193-201 and accompanying text
(discussing plaintiffs' failure to gain standing to enjoin allegedly illegal governmental practices
in O'Shea, Rizzo, and Lyons). In Kolender v. Lawson, O'Connor, writing for the majority,
however, noted that the defendant had satisfied the standing requirement of continuing
threatened injury. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 355 n.3 (1983) (O'Connor, J.). In
Kolender, local police had detained the defendant some fifteen times under a stop-and-identify
statute. Id. at 354. O'Connor found a sufficient likelihood that the defendant would continue
to be detained under that statute in the future. Id. at 355 n.3.
193. 414 U.S. 488 (1974). In O'Shea v. Littleton, a plaintiff-class consisting primarily of
blacks and indigents alleged discriminatory practices in the administration of the local criminal
justice system of Cairo, Illinois. Id. at 490-91. The plaintiff-class charged that the local
magistrate and judge had set bond arbitrarily in criminal cases, had imposed harsher sentences
on members of the plaintiff-class than on other defendants and had required members of the
plaintiff-class to pay jury fees. Id. at 492. The O'Shea Court held that the plaintiff class did
not meet the requirements of article III standing. Id. at 493. The Court noted that the complaint
did not allege any specific injury committed by the defendants against the named plaintiffs, did
not allege the unconstitutionality of any state statutes, and did not demonstrate the probability
of future harm to the plaintiff class. Id. at 495-97. In seeking a proper balance between state
and federal courts, Justice White, writing for the majority, refused to intervene in the state
administration of state criminal laws without a more immediate threat of irreparable injury. Id.
at 499. The presence of § 1983 as a basis for federal intervention, in the Court's view, did not
remove the principles of comity and federalism from the Court's consideration. Id.; see 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) (providing that every person who under color of law deprives another of
any lawful right, privilege, or immunity shall be liable in civil action).
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Rizzo v. Goode, 9 and City of Los Angeles v. Lyons.9 The O'Shea, Rizzo, and
Lyons decisions severely restrained the discretion of district court judges to

194. 423 U.S. 362 (1976). In Rizzo v. Goode, two plaintiff-classes, representing the citizens
of Philadelphia and a class of minority residents, sued the Mayor, City Managing Director, and
Police Commissioner of Philadelphia in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania, alleging a pattern of police mistreatment of the public. Id. at 364-65 & 364
n.l. The district court found evidence that individual police officers had mistreated members
of the public in violation of the citizens' constitutional rights, but the court noted that the
plaintiff-classes had not joined the individual policemen as party-defendants. See id. at 367-68,
371. The lower federal court further noted that the plaintiff-classes had developed no evidence
to establish that the named defendants had authorized or encouraged the violations. See id. at
368, 371. The district court, however, did find that police procedures for handling citizen
complaints discouraged the filing of such complaints. See id. at 368-69. The district court,
therefore, entered a detailed final order revising the reporting procedures and reserving the
power to review the new procedures and to intervene if the revisions were not effective. See id.
at 364-65, 365 n.2. The Rizzo defendants appealed from the district court's intrusion into the
internal operation of the police department. Id. at 366. The Supreme Court in Rizzo approached
the exercise of remedial discretion from the perspectives of standing, liability under § 1983, and
federalism. Id. at 371-81; see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) (providing that every person who under
color of law deprives another of any lawful right, privilege, or immunity is liable in civil action).
Relying on its decision in O'Shea v. Littleton, the Rizzo Court found that the plaintiff-classes
had no standing to request injunctive relief because an injunction against the police department
would have only a speculative effect on the likelihood of the plaintiffs' being abused in the
future. 423 U.S. at 372-73. The Court further held that the plaintiffs could not maintain their
suit under § 1983 because the defendants acting in their capacity as local government administrators had not deprived the plaintiffs of their constitutional rights. Id. at 377; see 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (providing that every person who under color of law deprives another of any lawful right,
privilege, or immunity is liable in civil action). The Rizzo Court, in the view of the dissent, had
narrowed the reach of § 1983 by refusing to impute the acts of employee-officers to agency
officials. See 423 U.S. at 384-85 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (rejecting majority's view that
officials were not responsible for acts of subordinates under § 1983). Additionally, the Rizzo
majority was persuaded that the principles of federalism required the Court to refrain from
interfering in the internal operation of the executive branch of a state government. Id. at 380.
195. 461 U.S. 95 (1983). In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, the Supreme Court considered
whether a plaintiff could seek injunctive relief from a local police practice of administering
chokeholds to arrestees without provocation. Id. at 97-98. The plaintiff in Lyons complained
that, in the course of stopping the plaintiff for a traffic violation, an officer had grabbed the
plaintiff and applied a chokehold around his neck, leaving the plaintiff unconscious and causing
injury to his larynx. Id. In a suit against the City of Los Angeles and four city policemen, the
plaintiff asked for injunctive relief against the unjustified use of chokeholds. Id. at 98. The
Lyons Court held that the plaintiff did not have standing to seek injunctive relief because of
the unlikelihood that city police would subject the plaintiff to chokeholds in the future. Id. at
105, 109. The Court noted that standing to sue for damages would not provide a basis to
request injunctive relief in every case. Id. at I 11. Justice White, writing for the Court, moreover,
found that concerns of federalism are at stake whenever the federal judiciary contemplates
equitable intrusion into the administration of a state criminal justice system. Id. at 112. The
Lyons Court held that although state courts may relax requirements for injunctive relief, the
federal judiciary would not intervene in the operation of state administrative agencies without
a compelling and continuing threat to a complainant. Id. at 113.
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provide injunctive relief against state and local governments. 96 The Court had
granted certiorari in O'Shea, Rizzo, and Lyons to consider whether the district
court judges had abused their discretion in granting remedies that interfered in
the daily operations of state agencies.

97

In each case the Supreme Court, how-

ever, considered whether the plaintiff had standing to request injunctive relief,
regardless of the plaintiffs' standing to request damages.'

98

The Court held in

each case that an injured plaintiff does not have standing to request injunctive
relief unless the plaintiff can show that the unlawful governmental practice will

continue to injure him specifically in the future. 99 The current Court's limitations on judicial power to enjoin unconstitutional state action on behalf of an
injured plaintiff has sparked increasing controversy. 200 This trend toward judi-

cial restraint in the exercise of equitable discretion differs from the far-reaching use of remedial discretion by the Warren Court.20 ' Although O'Connor's
approval of the Court's narrow approach to remedial standing is indirect,

O'Connor's support of the controversial doctrine of remedial standing in Rizzo,
Lyons, and O'Shea is consistent with her general reluctance to intrude in the
affairs of state governments.
Justice O'Connor's exercise of judicial restraint, however, is not tantamount to an abdication of the Court's role as defender of individual constitutional rights. The overwhelming trend in O'Connor's opinions, motivated by

both separation of powers and considerations of federalism, is to limit access
to federal courts and to infuse state government with increased independence to
maintain the health of a federal system. Although O'Connor would limit the

sphere in which the Court may act, O'Connor has not diminished the power of
the Court to function within that sphere. For example, O'Connor has exer-

cised the full powers of the federal court to strike down, in the face of constitutional challenge, state laws burdening the institutional press 22 or perpetuating

196. See generally Note, No Holds Barred in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons: Standing to
Seek Injunctions in Federal Court Against Municipalities, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 183
(1984) (Lyons limits injunctive relief against municipalities).
197. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 100; Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 366; O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 492-93.
198. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 101-05, 111; Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 371-73; O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 49399.
199. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 101-02; Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 372; O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 496-97.
200. See generally Fallon, Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes
on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1984) (criticizing Lyons Court's
consideration of effectiveness of remedy sought in initial standing decision).
201. See Note, supra note 196, at 198 (Lyons decision reverses earlier trend in Supreme
Court to provide forum for injunctive relief). See generally Fiss, Forward: The Forms of
Justice, 93 HAgv. L. Rsv. 1 (1979) (exploring unique character of structural lawsuit and Warren
Court's use of injunction to direct change within organizations that challenged constitutional
values).
202. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 592-93 (1983) (O'Connor, J.) (invalidating differential state taxation of certain newspapers);
see also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for the County of Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596, 611
(1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (concurring in invalidation of state law mandating exclusion
of public from criminal trials during testimony of minor who was victim of sex offense).
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gender discrimination. 2 3 Moreover, O'Connor has not been unwilling to invalidate state sentencing proceedings imposing the death penalty when the state
24
court has failed to give sufficient consideration to mitigating circumstances. 0
In the area of gender discrimination, Justice O'Connor would manipulate the
standards of federal judicial review of state laws to lower the standard of review of state legislation prohibiting gender discrimination in the workplace 2° 203. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 733 (1982) (O'Connor, J.)
(invalidating under equal protection clause state statute limiting admission to state-supported
nursing school to women).
204. See Arizona v. Rumsey, 104 S. Ct. 2305, 2311 (1984) (O'Connor, J.) (double jeopardy
clause bars resentencing capital defendant to death when court in trial-like proceeding initially
had sentenced defendant to life imprisonment); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 827-31 (1982)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (finding that state court had violated eighth amendment in refusing
to consider mitigating evidence in death sentencing decision); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104, 117-19 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stressing eighth amendment protection in
requiring state court to consider all mitigating circumstances in death sentencing decision); cf.
California v. Ramos, 103 S. Ct. 3446, 3459-60 (1983) (O'Connor, J.) (state legislature may
determine factors that sentencing jury may consider in death sentencing decisions as long as
statutory instructions do not violate eighth amendment); Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660,
672-73 (1983) (O'Connor, J.) (holding that state court's decision to revoke defendant's probation
automatically and to imprison defendant for failure to pay fine or make restitution without
considering reasons for nonpayment and possible alternative punishments other than imprisonment was fundamentally unfair and, therefore, violated due process clause).
205. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244, 3259 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the Supreme Court addressed the first
amendment associational rights of the U.S. Jaycees (Jaycees), a nonprofit membership corporation, to limit full membership to men. Id. at 3246-47. Two chapters of the Jaycees in
Minnesota opened membership to women in contravention of the national organization's bylaws.
Id. at 3247. Following threats by the president of the national organization to revoke the
chapters' charters, the members of the Minnesota chapters filed charges against the national
organization with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights under the Minnesota Human
Rights Act, claiming that the bylaw provisions excluding women from regular membership were
discriminatory. See id. at 3248. A Minnesota state examiner found that the Jaycees came within
the reach of the statute and ordered the national organization to stop its discriminatory policy
against women and to end sanctions against the Minnesota chapters. See id. The Jaycees then
pursued an action in federal court, alleging that Minnesota state officials had violated the
Jaycees' first amendment rights of free speech and association and that the Human Rights Act
as applied to the Jaycees was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. See id. at 3348-49.
Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan distinguished two associational rights, the freedom of
intimate association and the freedom of expressive association. Id. at 3250. A commentator has
noted that, in Roberts, the freedom of intimate association flows from the privacy interest
protected by the due process clause while the first amendment protects the right of expressive
association. Linder, Freedom of Association After Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 82 MIcH.
L. REv. 1878, 1884 (1984). Brennan held that the Jaycees could not assert any rights based on
the freedom of intimate association because the Jaycees were a large group and were unselective
in membership recruitment. 104 S. Ct. at 3251. Furthermore, although the majority recognized
that Minnesota's order requiring the Jaycees to admit women to regular membership implicated
the Jaycees' freedom of expressive association, the Court found Minnesota's interest in
prohibiting gender discrimination compelling and held that the inclusion of women did not
affect the content of the Jaycees' expressive activity. Id. at 3252, 3254-55.
Justice O'Connor rejected the Roberts majority's use of a balancing test to weigh state
interests against the Jaycees' associational rights. Id. at 3258 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In
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and to increase the burden on the states to justify statutes perpetuating discrimination.206 O'Connor's willingness to increase the power of the states to
O'Connor's view, the threshold issue in such cases is whether an association seeking first
amendment protection is involved predominantly in expressive activities or is engaged primarily
in commercial activity. Id. at 3259. According to O'Connor, characterizing an association as a
commercial association would limit the constitutional protection the association could claim.
Id. at 3258-59. O'Connor would apply a rational basis test rather than a balancing test as the
standard of review of state legislation infringing on the associational rights of commercial
associations. See id. at 3259 (commercial association should be subject to rationally related state
regulation of membership). Although Roberts involved a challenge to gender discrimination, no
language in O'Connor's opinion limits the opinion's applicability to gender discrimination. See
id. (discussing only discrimination in general).
206. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 733 (1982) (O'Connor, J.)
(invalidating state statute that limited admissions to state-supported nursing school to women).
In Mississippi Univ.for Women v. Hogan, the Supreme Court considered whether a Mississippi
statute limiting admissions to the Mississippi University for Women School of Nursing (MUW),
a state-supported nursing school, to women violated the equal protection clause. Id. at 719.
Traditionally, claims arising under the equal protection clause have been subject to either the
strict scrutiny test or the rational basis test. See Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming
Breakdown of the Levels of Scrutiny, 45 Omo ST. L.J. 161, 161-63 (1984) (explaining
development of strict scrutiny and rational basis test from 1930's). To survive the rational basis
test, a statute merely must bear a rational relationship to a state interest. Id. at 161-62. To
survive strict scrutiny, on the other hand, the challenged statute necessarily must reflect a
compelling state interest. Id. at 162. The Court developed strict scrutiny to protect fundamental
rights threatened by legislation, although Shaman claims that the Court's classification of rights
as fundamental has been somewhat inconsistent. Id. at 162, 176-77. The courts rarely have
nullified a statute under the rational basis test, whereas a statute rarely has survived strict
scrutiny. Id. at 161-62, 168, 173. In Hogan, O'Connor, writing for a 5-4 majority, however,
applied an intermediate level of review. 458 U.S. at 723-24. For a facially discriminatory statute
to survive the intermediate level of review, the discriminatory means must bear a substantial
relationship to important state objectives. Id. at 724; see, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S.
455, 459 (1981) (gender discrimination must be substantially related to important state purpose);
Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980) (gender discrimination must be
substantially related to important governmental objectives); Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979) (gender discrimination must bear substantial relationship to
important state goal). Although the Court had not employed the intermediate level of review
consistently to gender discrimination, the substantially-related standard was not new when the
Court decided Hogan. See Shaman, supra, at 169 & n.90 (citing cases prior to Hogan in which
Supreme Court established intermediate level of judicial review). Commentators, however,
generally have regarded Hogan as strengthening the intermediate standard of review for gender
discrimination. See Note, The End of an Era for Single-Sex Schools?: Mississippi University
for Women v. Hogan, 15 CONN. L. Ray. 353, 363, 371 (1983) (claiming that Hogan reaffirmed
intermediate level of review of gender discrimination); Note, Mississippi University for Women
v. Hogan: Gender Discrimination-Establishing a Consistent Standard of Review, 10 OHio N.U.
L. Rav. 159, 159 & n.4, 163-64, 168 (1983) (claiming that Hogan clarified intermediate level of
review as appropriate standard for gender discrimination).
A primary dispute between the parties in Hogan focused on which party had the burden
of proof. See Brief for Respondent at 8-9, Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718 (1982) (arguing that MUW had failed to establish substantial relationship between affirmative
action and discriminatory admissions policy); Reply Belief for Petitioner at 1, Mississippi Univ.
for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (arguing that Hogan had burden of establishing that
discriminatory admission policies bore no relation to state interests and that he had presented
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prohibit discrimination is particularly significant because of her narrow con-

struction of federal anti-discrimination legislation. 217
Although Justice O'Connor has upheld state statutes in the face of first
amendment challenges, 20 1 O'Connor has been less consistent in deferring to
state legislative judgment when the institutional press challenges the constitutionality of state law under the first amendment." 9 In Minneapolis Star and
Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue,2 ° for example, O'Connor considered whether a state use tax on paper and ink levied on a limited

number of newspapers violated first amendment rights.211 O'Connor recognized at the outset that states may tax the press in a manner generally applicable to all businesses.212 O'Connor raised the level of scrutiny, however, by
increasing the burden on the state to justify selective taxation of the press. 2*
O'Connor, writing for the majority, held that Minnesota's objective to raise
revenue did not justify special tax treatment of the press because the state easily could have raised revenues by a tax evenhandedly applied to all businesses.2 1 4 Moreover, O'Connor presumed that no state interest could justify

little evidence to support his claim). Conflicting case law did not resolve the burden of proof
issue. Compare Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981) (party seeking to uphold
discriminatory statute bears burden of proof) and Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446
U.S. 142, 151 (1980) (party defending discrimination bears burden of proof) with Personnel
Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 276, 281 (1979) (burden of proof rests with plaintiff
challenging statute). O'Connor, writing for the Court in Hogan, placed the burden of proof on
the state. 458 U.S. at 724. By coupling the intermediate level of review with a shift of the
burden of proof to the defendant state, O'Connor's opinion in Hogan structured judicial review
to give the plaintiff a decided advantage in challenging sex discrimination under the equal
protection clause. The Hogan majority subsequently found that Mississippi was unable to justify
the discriminatory admissions practices at MUW. Id. at 727-33.
207. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of the City of New York, 103 S. Ct.
3221, 3237 (1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (discriminatory intent is necessary for relief under
Title VI); General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 403 (1982)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (concurring in holding that cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981
requires proof of intent to discriminate); Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida, 457 U.S. 496,
516-17 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (relief under § 1983 does not require finding of
discriminatory intent, but Congress should revise statute to require intent); see also Ford Motor
Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 238-39 (1982) (O'Connor, J.) (discriminatee's refusal of employment
offered by employer charged with Title VII violation tolls employer's backpay liability).
208. See Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 107, 109-12
(1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Court should weigh more
heavily state interests in disclosure when individuals who seek first amendment protection are
recipients rather than contributors of political funds); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 774
(1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (concurring in Court's recognition of compelling state interest
in banning distribution of child pornography).
209. See supra note 202 (noting cases in which O'Connor has protected institutional press).
210. 460 U.S. 575 (1983) (O'Connor, J.).
211. Id. at 576-79.
212. Id.at 581.
213. Id. at 583, 585.
214. Id.at 586.
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Minnesota's decision to limit the special tax to a small group of papers. 251 The
state of Minnesota argued that the special use tax in fact favored the press by
taxing the cost of wholesale supplies rather than imposing a tax on general
sales. 21 6 O'Connor, however, regarded tax laws that permit differential taxation of the press to give state legislatures potential censorship power. 17 Moreover, O'Connor felt that the Court was ill-prepared to evaluate the relative tax
burdens implicit in state taxation schemes. 218 O'Connor's stated concern for the
limitations of the Court in tax matters, however, is unpersuasive in light of her
own straightforward approach on several occasions to complex tax issues. 2 9
Although O'Connor invalidates state efforts to tax the press in a differential
manner, she preserves the valuable right of the state to tax the press as a member of the business community.
Justice O'Connor also has invoked the power of the Court to protect
individuals from what she perceives as unconstitutional state sentencing
processes. O'Connor has demonstrated a willingness to intrude on state
courts to protect the threatened constitutional rights of state criminal defendants in sentencing proceedings under the double jeopardy clause, 220 the due

215.. Id. at 591-92.
216. Id. at 588.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 589-90.
219. See Commissioner v. Engle, 104 S. Ct. 597, 603-10 (1984) (O'Connor, J.) (construing
Internal Revenue Code provisions allowing deductions for percentage depletion on income
received from oil and gas leases); Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 304-17 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (assessing tax liability from sale of partnership property subject to
nonrecourse mortgage greater in amount than fair market value of property); Hillsboro Nat'l
Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370, 377-91 (1983) (O'Connor, J.) (determining applicability
of tax benefit rule to deductions claimed by two corporate taxpayers challenged by Internal
Revenue Service due to subsequent events).
220. See Arizona v. Rumsey, 104 S. Ct. 2305, 2311 (1984) (O'Connor, J.) (double jeopardy
clause bars resentencing capital defendant to death when court in trial-like proceeding initially
had sentenced defendant to life imprisonment). In Arizona v. Rumsey, a jury convicted the
defendant of armed robbery and first degree murder. See id. at 2307. The trial judge held a
separate sentencing hearing to consider mitigating and aggravating circumstances bearing on the
sentencing decision. See id. Arizona law defined murder for pecuniary gain as an aggravating
circumstance. Id.; see Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(5) (Supp. 1984) (commission of
offense as consideration for anything of pecuniary value is aggravating circumstance). The trial
judge construed the statutory language to include only murder for hire, not murders committed
during a robbery. See 104 S. Ct. at 2307-08. Because the trial judge found no other aggravating
circumstances, the judge concluded that state law prevented the court from imposing the death
penalty. See id. at 2308. On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court held that a robbery committed
during a murder would be an aggravating circumstance under the statute in question. See id.
On remand, the trial court adopted the state supreme court's construction of murder for
pecuniary gain and sentenced the defendant to death. See id. at 2308-09. The Arizona Supreme
Court on review found that the imposition of the death sentence on remand had violated the
double jeopardy clause, and the state supreme court, therefore, reduced the sentence to life
imprisonment. See id. at 2309. The state of Arizona petitioned for certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court. Id. The Rumsey Court held that when a state sentencing hearing
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process clause,2 1 and the eighth amendment.m In particular, O'Connor is
sensitive to the constraints that eighth amendment jurisprudence has placed
on the states in reaching a decision whether to sentence a state criminal
defendant to death. 223 For example, in Eddings v. Oklahoma,27 O'Connor,
concurring with the majority, wrote separately to stress the federal courts'
duty to remand for resentencing any case in which the state sentencer failed
resembles a trial, protection from double jeopardy attaches to the criminal defendant. Id. at
2309-10, 2311. O'Connor, in writing for the majority, found that the failure of the prosecution
to persuade the sentencer to impose the death penalty was an acquittal on the merits that barred
the court from resentencing the defendant to death, even if the first sentencing decision was
based on errors of law. Id. at 2310-11.
221. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672-73 (1983) (O'Connor, J.) (holding that
state court's decision to revoke defendant's probation automatically and to imprison defendant
for failure to pay fine or make restitution without considering reasons for nonpayment and
possible alternative punishments other than imprisonment was fundamentally unfair and,
therefore, violated due process clause).
222. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 827-31 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (state
court violated eighth amendment in refusing to consider mitigating circumstances in sentencing
defendant to death); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117-19 (1982) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (stressing eighth amendment protection requiring state court to consider all mitigating circumstances in death sentencing decisions).
223. See California v. Ramos, 103 S. Ct. 3446, 3451-53 (1983) (O'Connor, J.) (outlining
eighth amendment constraints on states' use of death penalty); supra note 222 (remanding death
penalty cases for resentencing because of state procedural error). In California v. Ramos,
O'Connor, writing for the majority, discussed in dictum the constraints the eighth amendment
placed on the states. 103 S. Ct. at 3451-53. According to O'Connor, procedural constraints
require that juries not exercise unguided discretion in imposing the death penalty. Id. at 345152. Substantively, the Supreme Court, in O'Connor's view, has disfavored vague sentencing
standards, which might lead to arbitrary decision making. Id. at 3452 (citing Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 195 n.46 (1976)). Furthermore, O'Connor noted that the Court has required the
sentencer to consider the individual characteristics of the defendant and has prohibited any
efforts to bar the sentencer from considering mitigating circumstances. Id. at 3452-53 (quoting
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)). The Court, moreover, has excluded use of a
presentence report as a basis for imposing the death sentence when the defendant had no
opportunity to respond to the content of the report. Id. at 3453 (quoting Gardner v. Florida,
430 U.S. 349 (1977)). See generally Hertz & Weisberg, In Mitigation of the Penalty of Death:
Lockett v. Ohio and the Capital Defendant'sRight to Considerationof Mitigating Circumstances, 69 CAun. L. REv. 317 (1981) (discussing eighth amendment jurisprudence as limit on state
legislatures and state courts); Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due
Process For Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1143 (1980) ("super due process" under the eighth
amendment requires discretion in death sentencing to avoid risk of error in execution).
224. 455 U.S. 104 (1982). In Eddings v. Oklahoma, an Oklahoma jury convicted Eddings,
a sixteen year old youth, of first degree murder for killing a highway patrolman during a traffic
stop. Id. at 105-06. Oklahoma law required the sentencing court to consider both mitigating
and aggravating circumstances, but did not define what might constitute a mitigating circumstance. Id. at 106. The trial judge sentenced Eddings to death, refusing as a matter of law to
consider Eddings' troubled and violent background as a mitigating circumstance. See id. at 10709. The state appeals court affirmed the death sentence. See id. at 109. On appeal to the United
States Supreme Court, the Eddings Court held that, as a matter of law, the state court must
consider all mitigating circumstances. Id. at 113-15. Specifically, the Court found that evidence
of a turbulent childhood would be evidence of a mitigating circumstance. Id. at 115-16.
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to consider all mitigating circumstances offered by the defendant. 225 The duty
to remand to allow consideration of mitigating circumstances, in O'Connor's
view, rests on the fear that if the courts did not require consideration of
such evidence there would be a greater risk that a state might execute a
defendant by mistake. 2 6 Similarly, in Enmund v. Florida,227 O'Connor would
have remanded the case for resentencing because of a procedural error by
the state courts in refusing to consider mitigating evidence presented by the
defendant. 228 In Enmund, the majority did not examine the procedural errors
that had occurred in the state proceedings, but rather disallowed the death
penalty itself as disproportionate punishment for felony murder when the
defendant had no intent to kill. 229 O'Connor, writing for the dissent, upheld
the proportionality of the death penalty for felony murder and rejected the
225. Id. at 117-19, 117 n.* (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Eddings, O'Connor relied on
the plurality opinion in Lockett v. Ohio, in which the plurality concluded that the sentencer
must consider any aspect of the defendant's character, record, or offense offered by the
defendant as a mitigating factor. Id.; see Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (sentencer
must consider any aspect of defendant's character, record, or offense as mitigating circumstance). One commentator has suggested that the plurality in Lockett mandating discretionary
sentencing to afford mercy to capital defendants may conflict with the prohibition against
arbitrariness in death sentencing. Radin, supra note 223, at 1150, 1153-55, 1180-81.
226. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 117-19, 117 n.*.
227. 458 U.S. 782 (1982). In Enmund v. Florida, Enmund had been tried under Florida
law for first degree murder and robbery following the deaths of an elderly couple that occurred
during the robbery. Id. at 783-84. The trial judge had instructed the jury that an unpremeditated
murder committed during a robbery was murder in the first degree. See id. at 784-85. The trial
judge also had instructed the jury that finding the defendant actually present and actively
assisting in a robbery during which another person had committed murder would support a
first degree murder conviction. See id. at 785. The jury convicted Enmund of first degree
murder, and the trial judge, finding no mitigating circumstances, sentenced Enmund to death.
See id. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed Enmund's conviction and his death sentence,
rejecting Enmund's argument that the eighth amendment prohibited imposition of the death
penalty absent proof of intent to kill. See id. at 786-87. Additionally, the state supreme court
rejected the trial court's findings that Enmund had planned the robbery and had killed the
victims, but the court, nevertheless, affirmed the death sentence. See id. at 786-87, 786 n.2.
Confusion persisted on appeal to the United States Supreme Court, concerning the extent of
Enmund's participation in the robbery. Id. at 786 n.2; see id. at 824 n.40 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (United States Supreme Court ignored statement by Enmund's counsel at sentencing
hearing that Enmund had planned robbery). The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
to consider whether the eighth and fourteenth amendments barred a state court from imposing
the death penalty when the defendant had killed no one, had made no such attempt and had
lacked the intent to kill. Id. at 787.
228. Id. at 827-31 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
229. Id. at 788-801 (White, J.). The majority in Enmund focused on the death penalty
itself, rather than the procedures followed in sentencing. Id.; see Note, The Felony Murder
Rule and the Death Penalty: Enmund v. Florida-Overreachingby the Supreme Court?, 19
NEw ENG. L. REv. 255, 272 (1983-1984) (majority ignored procedural errors committed by state
courts); Note, JurisprudentialConfusion in Eighth Amendment Analysis, 38 U. MIAMi L. REv.
357, 366, 370 (1984) (majority focused on death penalty itself rather than procedures followed
in sentencing). The Enmund Court recognized a trend among state legislatures and sentencing
juries to reject the death penalty as an appropriate punishment for participation in a robbery
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majority's attempt to create a federal constitutional level of intent that would
limit substantively the state's ability to impose the death penalty. 230 O'Connor, however, challenged the procedures by which the state courts had upheld
during which another committed murder. 458 U.S. at 789-96. The Court, arriving at its own
determination of proportionality, found that the record as interpreted by the state supreme
court did not support a finding of an intent-to-kill and that the eighth amendment barred the
state from assigning the same degree of culpability to Enmund as to an actual murderer. Id. at
798, 801. The Court also found that the use of the death penalty for felony murder did not
serve the deterrent and retributive purposes that justified imposing the death penalty. Id. at
798-801.
230. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 810-26 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In Enmund, Justice O'Connor
vigorously dissented from the majority's decision to disallow the death penalty for felony
murder and criticized the Court's interference with state definitions of legal guilt. Id. at 80102, 824-25. In determining whether the death sentence was proportionate punishment, O'Connor
examined the practices of legislatures and juries, and the relationship of the punishment to the
harm actually caused and to the blameworthiness of the particular defendant. Id. at 815. Unlike
the majority, O'Connor found persuasive signs of legislative and jury acceptance of the death
penalty for felony murder. Id. at 816-23. In O'Connor's view, Enmund's death penalty was
proportionate to the harm caused by Enmund's participation in the robbery-murders because
under Florida law he was responsible for the deaths that ensued. Id. at 824. In considering
whether the death penalty was proportionate to the defendant's blameworthiness, O'Connor
deferred to the judgment of the state sentencer who, in O'Connor's view, is in the better
position to evaluate the blameworthiness of a particular defendant. Id. at 825, 826. O'Connor
rejected the majority's displacement of a sentencer's determination of blameworthiness based
on less than an intent to kill with a constitutionally-mandated level of intent to kill that,
according to the majority, a sentencer must find before imposing the death penalty. Id. at 82425; see id. at 801 (White, J.) (death penalty inconsistent with eighth amendment absent proof
of intent to kill).
The Enmund Court was sharply divided in finding intent to kill a substantive constraint
on state courts in the imposition of the death penalty. Justice O'Connor's refusal to support a
constitutionally based minimum level of intent in Enmund resurfaced in her opinion for the
majority in California v. Ramos. See California v. Ramos, 103 S. Ct. 3446, 3451-53 (1983)
(O'Connor, J.) (failing to include intent to kill as substantive or procedural limit on states'
right to impose death penalty). In Ramos, O'Connor, joined by four justices, cited Enmund
only for the proposition that a sentencer must consider mitigating circumstances before
sentencing a defendant to death. See 103 S. Ct. at 3453 & n.14 (failing to include any reference
to constitutionally required level of intent).
In Enmund, O'Connor would have deferred to state legislative judgments concerning a
defendant's eligibility for the death penalty despite her retention of control over the procedures
by which the state court subsequently could invoke the death penalty. See 458 U.S. at 824-25
(state law is best able to define legal guilt). In Ramos, O'Connor demonstrated a similar
deference to state legislative judgment concerning factors which did not threaten eighth
amendment values that a sentencing jury may consider before imposing a death sentence. 103
S. Ct. at 3453, 3459-60. In Ramos, O'Connor reversed a state supreme court decision, which
held that a statutory jury instruction violated the federal constitution. Id. at 3450. In Ramos,
a California jury had convicted a criminal defendant of first degree murder, attempted murder,
and robbery. See id. at 3449. In reaching a decision on sentencing, California law had provided
that the trial judge must instruct a capital sentencing jury that the governor could commute a
sentence of life imprisonment without parole to a lesser sentence with the possibility of parole.
See id. at 3449-50. The jury sentenced Ramos to death, but the California Supreme Court
reversed, finding the statutory jury instruction commonly known as the Briggs Instruction
unconstitutional. See id. at 3450. O'Connor, writing for the Court, upheld the constitutionality
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Enmund's death sentence.2 3' In O'Connor's view, the state supreme court
had erred in affirming the death sentence without requiring the trial court
to reconsider mitigating evidence concerning Enmund's ancillary role in the
robbery and his relative lack of intent to kill after the state supreme court
had overturned the factual basis on which the trial court's sentencing decision
rested. 232 Although both the majority and the dissent in Enmund regarded
Enmund's death sentence as unconstitutional, O'Connor departed from the
reasoning of the majority by blending her support for legislative determinations of legal guilt with her support for eighth amendment constraints on
process.
Although Justice O'Connor is not unwilling to use the power of the
federal court to vindicate individual constitutional rights, considerations
other than the plaintiff's bare allegations of deprivation have provided a
basis for O'Connor's decision whether to invoke the remedial power of the
Court. Separation of powers considerations have focused O'Connor's attention on the substantive and procedural standing hurdles that a plaintiff
complaining of unlawful government must overcome before the federal court
may sanction judicial action against a coordinate and separate branch of
government 233 and the extent to which the federal court must defer to
Congress' constitutional authority to curtail judicial power. 2 4 Additionally,
O'Connor has considered the legislative purpose behind Congress' enactment
of remedial legislation to guide the federal courts in fashioning equitable
relief for plaintiffs who prevail under the federal statute. 5 O'Connor's
of the jury instruction. Id. at 3453, 3459-60. O'Connor rejected Ramos' first claim that the
Briggs Instruction was irrelevant and speculative. Id. at 3453. O'Connor construed the Briggs
Instruction as permitting the jury to consider the future dangerousness of the capital defendant,
a consideration the Supreme Court had found permissible. Id. at 3453-54; see Jurek v. Texas,
428 U.S. 262, 274-76 (1976) (joint opinion by Stewart, J., Powell, J., and Stevens, J.) (although
difficult to make, predictions of future criminality are essential and commonly are made in
criminal justice system). Likewise, O'Connor rejected Ramos' second claim that the Briggs
Instruction diverted the jury's attention from the defendant to possible actions a governor might
take in the future, finding rather that the instruction merely provided additional accurate
information to the sentencing jury. 103 S. Ct. at 3455-57. O'Connor also rejected Ramos' third
claim that the Briggs Instruction unduly influenced the jury to choose the death penalty. Id. at
3457-59. O'Connor did not find that informing the jury of the governor's power to commute
a death sentence would balance the impact of the Briggs Instruction describing the governor's
power to commute a life sentence, nor did she find that the challenged instruction impermissibly
biased the jury's sentencing decision. Id. See generally Hertz & Weisberg, supra note 223, at
346-49 (arguing that capital defendant has right under eighth amendment and due process clause
to draw attention in jury instructions to mitigating circumstances). Although the Ramos Court
held that the eighth amendment tolerated the Briggs Instruction, O'Connor noted that state
legislatures are free to offer greater protection to state criminal defendants by prohibiting such
an instruction. 103 S. Ct. at 3459-60.
231. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 827-31 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 830-31, 831 n.46.
233. See supra notes 22-63 and accompanying text (discussing standing issue in Allen).
234. See supra notes 78-98 and accompanying text'(discussing jurisdictional issue in Regan).
235. See supra notes 99-109 and accompanying text (discussing exercise of equitable
discretion under Title VII in Ford).
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opinions reflect even greater attention to concerns of state sovereignty,2 6 the
presence of independent state legislative judgments, 237 and the relationship
between the state and federal court systems. 238 Furthermore, the integrity of
state government appears to present to O'Connor a need for restraint when
plaintiffs challenge state governmental practices and seek injunctive relief
that would require the federal courts to restructure or monitor state agencies.Y9 Faced with a threat to the principles of federalism, O'Connor repeatedly has been an outspoken Justice on behalf of protectible state interests.
This early trend toward judicial restraint during the first three years of
O'Connor's tenure appears strong and consistent, and forms the beginning
of Justice O'Connor's record as an American jurist.
BARBARA OLSON BRUCKMANN

236. See supra notes 121-49 and accompanying text (discussing challenges to state autonomy
in FERC and Garcia).
237. See supra notes 173-90 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional challenges to
state law).
238. See supra notes 151-72 and accompanying text (discussing federal review of state court
judgments in Long, Lundy, and Isaac).
239. See supra notes 191-201 and accompanying text (noting O'Connor's indirect support
of remedial standing doctrine).

